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In a knowledge intensive economy, a company’s intellectual capital, whether it is 
derived from its employees, customer databases or brands, undoubtedly contribute to 
a company’s success and its ultimate value.  Most of these intangible assets can not be 
included within a company’s balance sheet and intellectual capital disclosures in the 
annual report and financial statements have been largely voluntary.
There are good reasons why companies may choose not to disclose information about 
these types of assets, not least the worry about losing competitive advantage, but there are 
clearly reasons why companies choose to make such voluntary disclosures.  It is argued 
that one reason for disclosing such information is to reduce the information gap between 
companies and investors and thus reduce the cost of capital.  This report investigates 
the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and the cost of equity capital.
The results of this study indicate that firms which make greater levels of intellectual 
capital disclosure benefit from a lower cost of equity capital than firms making lower 
intellectual capital disclosures.  The study estimates that this benefit is significant, at 2.8 
percentage points.   The study recognises that other factors may also be at play and that 
further research is necessary to investigate the impact of these other factors.  
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Foreword
In a knowledge intensive economy, a company’s intellectual capital, 
whether it is derived from its employees, customer databases or brands, 
undoubtedly contribute to a company’s success and its ultimate value. 
Most of these intangible assets can not be included within a company’s 
balance sheet and intellectual capital disclosures in the annual report 
and financial statements have been largely voluntary.
There are good reasons why companies may choose not to disclose 
information about these types of assets, not least the worry about losing 
competitive advantage, but there are clearly reasons why companies 
choose to make such voluntary disclosures.  It is argued that one reason 
for disclosing such information is to reduce the information gap between 
companies and investors and thus reduce the cost of capital.  This report 
investigates the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and 
the cost of equity capital.
The results of this study indicate that firms which make greater 
levels of intellectual capital disclosure benefit from a lower cost of equity 
capital than firms making lower intellectual capital disclosures.  The 
study estimates that this benefit is significant, at 2.8 percentage points. 
The benefit of such disclosure is increased within intellectual capital 
intensive sectors where this differential rises to 3.3 percentage points.  
The study compares this benefit with the similar but smaller range 
of benefit to the cost of equity capital shown by firms making lower 
or higher levels of voluntary financial disclosure and concludes that 
intellectual capital disclosure seems to dominate financial disclosure in 
influencing the cost of equity capital.  It recognises that other factors 
may also be at play and that further research is necessary to investigate 
the impact of these other factors.  
Mangena-Pike (Nov 09).indd   5 17/03/2010   14:30:25
ii Foreword
The study also identifies that disclosures regarding intellectual capital 
are more extensive than previous studies have suggested.  It suggests that 
companies do respond to voluntary reporting guidelines and that further 
mandatory requirements may not be required.
This project was funded by the Scottish Accountancy Trust for 
Education and Research (SATER).  The Research Committee of The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) has also been 
happy to support this project.  The Committee recognises that the views 
expressed do not necessarily represent those of ICAS itself, but hopes 
that the project will add to the debate about the costs and benefits of 
intellectual capital disclosure.
David Spence
Convener, Research Committee
March 2010
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Executive summary
Background 
The growth of the knowledge-intensive economy over the last two 
decades has precipitated considerable interest in the role of intellectual 
capital in organisations.  There seems to be general consensus that 
intellectual capital is an integral part of a firm’s value-creating processes 
and is important for creating and maintaining competitive advantage 
(see OECD, 2006; Holland, 2006).  Indeed, firms invest heavily in 
intellectual capital (also called intangible assets), such as research and 
development, brand development, franchises, customer-base creation, 
and staff development.  However, these internally generated assets are 
either immediately expensed in the financial statements or arbitrarily 
amortised and therefore are not fully reflected in the financial statements. 
Consequently, the information asymmetries between firms and users of 
financial reports have become more acute (Barth et al., 2001; Holland, 
2006), particularly given that intellectual capital investments are unique 
to specific firms and cannot be inferred by looking at other firms.  This 
has precipitated debate about the value-relevance of traditional financial 
reports given their failure to fully reflect information about the corporate 
value-creating processes and activities of the firm (Francis and Shipper, 
1999; Lev, 2001).  Several research reports (ICAEW, 2003; OECD, 
2006) and academic studies (Lev, 2001; Holland, 2006) have called for 
firms to provide greater disclosure of intellectual capital information 
in the annual reports.  Accounting regulators around the world, for 
example, the Accounting Standards Board in the UK, have issued 
guidelines (such as the Operating and Financial Review) to assist firms 
in reporting information, including intellectual capital information. 
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Indeed the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (FSA, 2007) and the 
business review (Companies Act, 2006) require firms to report on some 
intellectual capital information.  Inspired by such calls and guidelines, a 
number of studies investigate the extent to which firms report intellectual 
capital information in annual reports and other media of communication 
(see Bozzolan et al., 2005; Unerman et al., 2007; Guthrie et al., 2007). 
The findings of these studies suggest that, although intellectual capital 
reporting is still low, there has been an increase in reporting over the years. 
Unerman et al. (2007), for example, also show substantial intellectual 
capital disclosures even in sectors where intellectual capital may not be 
expected to be a significant value driver, such as real estate, utilities and 
retail sectors.  
A fundamental issue surrounding the debate about corporate 
reporting is whether firms benefit from improved disclosure via a lower 
cost of capital.  A commonly expressed view by academics (see Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000; Lev, 2001), practitioners (see Levitt, 1998), and 
accounting bodies and regulators (see FASB, 2001; IASB, 2002; OECD, 
2006) is that enhanced disclosure lowers the cost of capital.  The logic of 
this view derives from the theory which suggests that greater disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry between managers and investors, thus 
enhancing market liquidity which lowers the required rate of return 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991).  However, empirical research on the 
relationship between disclosure and cost of capital is inconclusive (see 
for example, Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005).  Further, the empirical 
work suggests that different types of disclosure may affect the cost of 
capital in different fashions.  Consequently, Botosan (2006, p. 38) calls 
for additional research ‘to further our understanding of the impact of 
different types of disclosure on cost of equity capital’.
Objectives of the study
The objective of this study is to provide some insights into the above 
by investigating, for the first time, the relationship between the cost of 
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equity capital and intellectual capital disclosure by UK firms.  Intellectual 
capital disclosure is an important dimension of the voluntary information 
set for which there is a growing trend in demand in the valuation of firms 
by investors (Holland, 2003; Burgman and Roos, 2007).  It comprises 
three categories: human capital, structural capital and relational capital. 
Human capital captures the knowledge, professional skills, experience 
and innovativeness of employees within an organisation.  Structural 
capital consists of the structures and processes employees develop 
and deploy in order to be productive, effective and innovative, whilst 
relational capital captures the knowledge of market channels, customer 
and supplier relationships, and governmental or industry networks.  The 
key questions addressed by this study are:
•	 Is there a negative association between the cost of equity capital and 
level of intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports?
•	 Is there a negative association between the cost of equity capital 
and the level of disclosure in the three individual intellectual capital 
categories (human, structural and relational capital)?
•	 Does the level of intellectual capital disclosure interact with voluntary 
financial disclosure to influence the cost of equity capital?
These questions are addressed using data for 126 UK firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange.  Intellectual capital and voluntary financial 
disclosures for the firms were measured from the annual reports published 
between March 2004 and February 2005.  The period was deliberately 
chosen in an attempt to reduce the effect of the Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR) and IFRS requirements which were to become mandatory 
starting 2005.  Disclosure was measured by a disclosure index, which 
was constructed from a content analysis of the annual reports.  This 
procedure involved development of a checklist of intellectual capital and 
financial information items (see Appendix one), and using the checklist, 
items were scored one if disclosed and zero if not disclosed in the annual 
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report.  The index was computed by dividing the score for the firm by 
the total number of items in the checklist.  The computation of the cost 
of equity capital was undertaken by applying the price-earnings growth 
(PEG) model developed by Easton (2004).  The model estimates the 
cost of capital using one-year- and two-year-ahead analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and share price data.  This data was obtained from I/B/E/S 
Datastream.  Data analysis was undertaken using descriptive statistics 
and correlation analyses.  
Key findings
The key findings of the analyses are detailed below.
Level of intellectual capital disclosure
•	 The level of intellectual capital disclosure in UK annual reports is 
extensive, with a mean disclosure level of 70% of the intellectual 
capital items used in this study being reported in some way.  This is 
surprisingly high particularly given that intellectual capital reporting 
is not regulated and, indeed, some recent studies such as Guthrie et 
al. (2007) and Unerman et al. (2007) show that intellectual capital 
disclosures are still low.  A possible reason for this is that the annual 
reports for this study were published in 2004 and 2005.  This was 
the time when the eventually repealed regulations for a mandatory 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) were to be introduced. 
Given that the OFR is a heavily intellectual capital related document, 
it is possible that firms were already responding to forthcoming 
regulations.  
•	 In terms of intellectual capital categories, firms seem to provide 
greater levels of information about human intellectual capital 
(74.6%) and structural intellectual capital (73.7%) than information 
on relational intellectual capital (62.3%).  Overall, it would seem 
that firms provide more human intellectual capital information 
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than in the other two categories, perhaps because of the belief that 
human capital provides the means by which firms enhance their 
competitiveness.  Hence, firms may disclose more of this information 
to signal the quality of their human capital and, therefore, their 
competence to compete.
•	 Further analysis dividing the firms into intellectual capital intensive 
sectors (such as banks, insurance, telecommunications, biotech and 
pharmaceuticals) and non-intellectual capital intensive sectors (such 
as utilities, retail, and real estate) indicates that both sectors disclose 
greater information about their human and structural intellectual 
capital.  However, firms in the intellectual capital intensive sectors 
seem to provide significantly higher relational intellectual capital 
than non-intellectual capital intensive sectors.  
Intellectual capital disclosure and cost of capital 
•	 The average cost of equity capital for the sampled UK listed firms, 
derived using the price-earnings growth model, is about 10.29%. 
For most firms (about 84.9% of the sample firms), the cost of equity 
capital ranges between 5% and 15%.  These results are consistent 
with those reported in Lee et al. (2006).
•	 Intellectual capital disclosure level is negatively associated with the 
cost of equity capital.  Firms with greater levels of intellectual capital 
disclosure have cost of equity capital estimates ranging from 2.35 
to 2.84 percentage points lower than for firms with low intellectual 
capital disclosures across all categories of intellectual capital.  The 
highest benefit for firms seems to come from a commitment to 
disclose greater levels of human intellectual capital information, for 
which there is a 2.84 percentage point difference between the costs 
of capital of high and low intellectual capital disclosing firms.  
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•	 The results also reveal that intellectual capital intensive sectors have 
a cost of equity capital that is about 0.88 percentage points higher 
than for firms in non-intellectual capital intensive sectors.  Lee et al. 
(2006) attribute the higher cost of capital in these sectors to greater 
investor uncertainty due to high growth, intense competition and 
short product life cycles associated with such sectors.  An analysis 
of the intellectual capital intensive sectors suggests that firms 
with greater disclosure of intellectual capital information benefit 
significantly more from a lower cost of capital than firms with lower 
disclosure.  The magnitude of the difference in the cost of equity 
capital is 3.32% lower for intellectual capital intensive sector firms 
with greater intellectual capital disclosures than those with lower 
disclosures.  
•	 The findings also support previous studies (such as Pike et al., 2000; 
Holland, 2003) that suggest that investors interact intellectual 
capital information with financial information in making investment 
decisions.  The cost of capital resulting from interacting intellectual 
capital disclosure and voluntary financial disclosure scores is 0.28% 
and 0.88% lower than for the individual intellectual capital and 
voluntary financial disclosures, respectively.  
Conclusions and policy implications
In conclusion, this study investigates the association between 
intellectual capital disclosure and the cost of capital of UK listed firms. 
The results of the study indicate that there is extensive disclosure of 
intellectual capital information by the firms.  In terms of the association 
between intellectual capital disclosure and the cost of capital, the findings 
of the study reveal that firms with greater intellectual capital disclosure in 
annual reports have lower cost of capital than firms with lower intellectual 
capital disclosures.  The results also show in line with other previous 
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studies (Hail, 2002; Botosan, 1997) that voluntary financial disclosure is 
negatively associated with the cost of capital, although intellectual capital 
disclosure dominates financial disclosure.  Further, the results suggest 
that financial and intellectual capital information interact to create a 
richer information set for investors, and firms with higher interaction of 
intellectual capital and financial disclosures seem to benefit more in terms 
of low cost of capital.  Overall, the findings of this study are consistent 
with the notion that disclosure of intellectual capital information may 
reduce uncertainty about the firm’s future earnings, leading investors to 
demand a lower rate of return.  
This study contributes to the understanding of the association 
between disclosure and the cost of capital in two main ways:
•	 It provides the first evidence of the relationship between the cost 
of equity capital and intellectual capital disclosure in the context 
of the UK.  
•	 Unlike previous studies that tend to investigate aggregate annual 
report disclosures, this is the first study to distinguish between 
intellectual capital and financial disclosures.  This distinction allows 
a determination of how each of the disclosure types is related to the 
cost of capital as well as how the two interact with each other to 
affect the cost of capital.  This is particularly important today given 
the debate on the role of intellectual capital and the weaknesses of 
the financial reporting model.  
Policy implications
The findings are of considerable importance to policy makers, the 
accounting profession and financial regulators: 
•	 An understanding of whether increased intellectual capital disclosure 
affects firms’ cost of capital provides policy makers and regulators 
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with a basis upon which to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
disclosure.  In view of the calls to improve the reporting of intellectual 
capital, these results are useful in evaluating the costs and benefits of 
potential regulations regarding the disclosure of intellectual capital 
information.  
•	 The extensive intellectual capital disclosure revealed in this report 
suggests that the decision to repeal the regulation for a mandatory 
OFR may have been appropriate as firms respond to voluntary 
reporting guidelines.  The focus for policy should be to develop best 
practice guidelines for intellectual capital reporting and encourage 
compliance with such guidelines.  Such an approach reduces 
problems with prescriptive guidelines which require enforcing.  
•	 Insights from these results are also important to managers of firms 
because they are able to see the benefit of enhanced disclosure in 
terms of a reduction in their firm’s cost of capital.  The realisation that 
there are cost of capital-related benefits in enhancing the reporting 
of intellectual capital information may lead to a commitment by 
firms to improve disclosure of this type of information.  This will 
also benefit market participants in terms of having more relevant 
and quality information available, and therefore reducing the cost 
of gathering private information.  
However, there is still need for further research into the costs and 
benefits of intellectual capital reporting.  Nevertheless, this report shows 
that intellectual capital disclosures are important to firms and the capital 
markets.  
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1introduction and aims of the study
Introduction
There has been much research investigating the economic consequences 
of information disclosure.  Christensen et al. (2007) suggest that such 
research has been motivated, in the main, by the notion that research on 
reporting consequences has implications for policy making, particularly, 
to the standard-setting process.  The underlying argument is that 
understanding the economic consequences of information disclosure 
can provide a basis for evaluating the costs and benefits of disclosure 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001), 
which are an important consideration in the standard-setting process 
(Barth et al., 2001; Botosan, 2006).  
In the context of the consequences of disclosure, an important and 
perhaps controversial issue for managers, academics and policy makers is 
whether firms benefit from increased disclosure via a lower cost of capital. 
Whilst some (for example, FASB, 2001, IASB, 2002; ASB, 2007) suggest 
that disclosure reduces cost of capital, others (see Financial Times, May 
7, 1999; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) argue that 
enhanced disclosure, particularly via timely reports (such as quarterly 
reports), increases share price volatility.  For example, Bushee and Noe 
(2000) show that increases in disclosure attract institutions that trade 
aggressively for short-term gains, thus exacerbating share price volatility. 
High share price volatility increases a firm’s perceived riskiness thereby 
raising the cost of capital.  In the light of such debates, a number of 
studies have attempted to provide insights into the relationship between 
the cost of equity capital and aggregate disclosures (Botosan, 1997; 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002; Francis et al., 2005; Espinosa 
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and Trombetta, 2007), social disclosures (Richardson and Welker, 2001), 
quarterly and other public relations disclosures (Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002) and timely strategic disclosures (Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005). 
In a review of these studies Botosan (2006) shows that the findings 
are generally mixed, and even more importantly, suggests that different 
types of disclosures may also affect the cost of capital in different fashions. 
For example, whilst some studies document a negative relationship with 
aggregate disclosures (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Francis et al., 2005) 
and timely strategic disclosures (Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005), others 
show a positive relationship with social disclosures (Richardson and 
Welker, 2001) and timely (quarterly report) disclosures (Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002).  Yet others reveal no relationship between the cost of 
capital and investor relations activities (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) 
and no evidence of a lower cost of capital for switching from local to 
IFRS/US GAAP (Daske, 2006).  Consequently, Botosan (2006, p. 38) 
calls for additional research ‘to further our understanding of the impact 
of different types of disclosure on cost of equity capital’.  Healy and 
Palepu (2001) also conclude, after an extensive review of the disclosure 
literature, that additional research is required to understand: (i) why firms 
engage in voluntary disclosure; and (ii) if disclosure affects the cost of 
capital.  Similarly, Bushee et al. (2003) also point out that although many 
disclosure studies have investigated disclosure, there still exists limited 
evidence regarding the capital market impact of broadly disseminating 
information.  
This study contributes to the debate on disclosure and cost of capital 
relationships by considering intellectual capital disclosure.  Intellectual 
capital disclosure is an important dimension of voluntary information 
for which there is growing demand (Holland, 2003, 2006; Burgman 
and Roos, 2007), yet limited evidence exists on the capital market 
impact of enhancing dissemination of the information.  Over the last 
two decades, intellectual capital has attracted considerable interest from 
both practitioners and academic researchers.  This increased attention 
has been primarily stimulated by the perceived role it plays in the 
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value-creation processes and activities within firms.  Intellectual capital 
is largely seen as an integral part of the firm’s value-creating processes 
(Pike et al., 2000; Holland, 2003; Bukh et al., 2005; OECD, 2006) 
as well as creating and maintaining competitive advantage (Holland, 
2006).  In today’s dynamic business environment, firms invest heavily 
in intellectual capital assets (also called intangibles) such as research and 
development, brand development, franchises, customer-base creation, 
and staff development.  The problem, however, is that these investments 
are either immediately expensed in the financial statements or arbitrarily 
amortised and therefore are not fully reflected in the financial statements. 
Consequently, the book values of firms with significant amounts of 
intellectual capital investments are unrelated to the market values (Amir 
and Lev, 1996; Brennan, 2001; Lev, 2001; Holland, 2003).  This, it is 
argued, has reduced the value-relevance of traditional financial reports 
(Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999).  Barth et al. 
(2001) and Holland (2003; 2006) argue that this has increased the 
information asymmetry between firms and users of financial reports. 
Aboody and Lev (2000) suggest that the information asymmetry between 
managers and users is more acute for intellectual capital than for other 
disclosures because it is unique to specific firms and cannot be inferred 
by looking at other firms.  This creates increased opportunities for moral 
hazard, adverse selection and other opportunistic behaviour by managers 
(Aboody and Lev, 2000; Holland, 2006).
In the light of the growing importance of intellectual capital and 
the limited value-relevance of traditional financial reports, a number of 
research reports (Beattie, 1999; FASB, 2001; ICAEW, 2003; OECD, 
2006; ASB, 2007) and academic studies (Aboody and Lev, 1998; Francis 
and Schipper, 1999; Lev, 2001; Holland, 2006) have called for firms 
to provide greater disclosure of intellectual capital information.  These 
reports and studies argue that intellectual capital information is the 
dominating factor in the process of valuing firms by investors.  Holland 
(2001; 2003; 2006) concludes, after interviewing fund managers and 
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analysts, that the market demands intellectual capital information and 
has incentives to create and use the information on the role of intellectual 
capital in corporate value-creation when making investment decisions. 
Additionally, Ernst & Young (1997) and Rajgopal et al. (2003) also 
suggest that analysts consider intellectual capital information when 
they make earnings forecasts.  Barth et al. (2001) and Barron et al. 
(2002) document that analyst coverage is greater for firms with intensive 
research and development and advertising expenses relative to their 
business.  Similarly, other studies show that specific intellectual capital 
indicators, such as research and development expenses (Amir and Lev, 
1996; Ballester et al., 2003), capitalisation of software development 
costs (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Aboody and Lev, 1998), and customer 
satisfaction (Ittner and Larcker, 1998) have an impact on share prices, 
suggesting that investors find them relevant for share valuation.  
These reports and studies inspired researchers to investigate the 
extent to which intellectual capital information is reported in annual 
reports (see Brennan, 2001; Vandemaele et al., 2005; Bozzolan et al., 
2005; Guthrie et al., 2007).  Such research documents that although 
intellectual capital reporting is still low, there has been an increase in 
intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports over the years.  Unerman 
et al. (2007), for example, also show substantial intellectual capital 
disclosures even in sectors intellectual capital may not be expected to be 
a significant value driver (such as real estate, utilities and retail).  In spite 
of these studies, a key issue that has not been considered in the literature 
is whether firms benefit from improved intellectual capital disclosure via 
a lower cost of capital.  Reducing the cost of capital has been suggested 
by academics (see Lev, 2001) and accounting bodies and regulators (see 
FASB, 2001; ICAEW, 2003; OECD, 2006) as the benefit of enhanced 
intellectual capital disclosure.  
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Aims of the study 
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between 
the cost of equity capital and intellectual capital disclosure.  From a 
theoretical perspective (see Verrecchia, 2001; Gietzmann and Trombetta, 
2003), and to the extent that intellectual capital is critical for firm 
valuations (see Lev, 2001; Holland, 2003; ICAEW, 2003), improved 
disclosure of intellectual capital information should help to reduce 
information asymmetry and the cost of capital.  Although there are many 
studies investigating voluntary disclosure, the extent to which enhanced 
levels of intellectual capital disclosure benefits firms in terms of cost of 
capital has received very little attention.  Much of the research on the 
consequences of intellectual capital disclosure has tended to focus on 
examining the relationship between share prices and specific intellectual 
capital indicators (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Ballester et al., 2003), 
rather than the cost of capital.  The exceptions to this are Singh and Van 
der Zahn (2007), who investigate the association between underpricing 
(as a proxy for cost of capital) and intellectual capital disclosures 
amongst Singapore initial public offerings (IPOs), and Kristandl and 
Bontis (2007), who examine the relationship between forward-looking 
and historical information and the cost of capital for listed companies 
in Austria, Germany, Sweden and Denmark.  The results of these two 
studies are mixed.  Whilst Singh and Van der Zahn (2007) find a positive 
association between underpricing and the extent of intellectual capital 
disclosure, Kristandl and Bontis (2007) report a negative relationship 
between forward-looking (intellectual capital) information and cost of 
capital.  In addition, Sing and Van der Zahn (2007) use under-pricing 
rather than the cost of capital directly and does not consider the effect of 
financial disclosures.  Kristandl and Bontis (2007) employ only a limited 
number of intellectual capital information items and their historical 
information only includes stock market information.  Additionally, 
the study does not consider the interaction effects of historical and 
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intellectual capital disclosures on the cost of capital.  Furthermore, none 
of these two studies consider the intellectual capital effects on cost of 
capital in UK firms despite the fact that intellectual capital is increasingly 
becoming the key driver of the UK economy (ICAEW, 2003; Unerman 
et al., 2007).  
As noted earlier, prior studies have considered the cost of capital 
effects of either aggregate disclosure (see Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; 
Francis et al., 2005) or certain specific types of disclosure (see Richardson 
and Welker, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Gietzmann and Ireland, 
2005).  Consequently, there exists no evidence on how the different 
types of disclosure combine and interact with each other to influence 
the cost of capital.  It may be the case that specific disclosures (such as 
intellectual capital) combine and interact with other disclosures (such 
as financial disclosure) to affect the cost of capital in different fashions. 
This logic is supported by prior work which suggests that: (1) there is 
a complementarity between financial and non-financial information in 
explaining share prices (Amir and Lev, 1996); and (2) intellectual capital 
combines and interacts with traditional physical and financial assets to 
create value in ways that are unique to individual firms (Pike et al., 2000; 
Holland, 2006).  Holland’s (2003; 2006) work also suggests that even the 
different intellectual capital categories (human capital, structural capital 
and relational capital) combine and interact with each other to create 
value in terms of known cash flows, and in terms of growing the current 
business.  The implication is that investors may, in their investment 
decision-making processes, use a combination of intellectual capital and 
financial disclosures to arrive at an appropriate valuation of the firm. 
Hence, the impact of disclosure on the cost of capital may be influenced 
by the combination and interaction of difference disclosure types.  
In light of the above discussions, this study extends the literature 
in two main dimensions.  First, it examines whether variations in 
intellectual capital disclosure explains differences in the cost of equity 
capital of UK listed firms.  In this respect, the analyses are carried out at 
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the aggregate intellectual capital disclosure level as well at the intellectual 
capital categories level (human capital; structural capital and relational 
capital) to determine whether the categories are also independently 
related to the cost of capital.  Second, and in line with the literature, 
the study explores whether intellectual capital disclosure and voluntary 
financial disclosure interact to influence the cost of equity capital.  In 
order to investigate these issues, the study employs voluntary intellectual 
capital information disclosed in annual reports.  The study also focuses 
on the cost of equity capital only rather than the cost of debt because 
UK firms are more reliant on equity capital for funding their activities 
(see Lee et al., 2006).
Significance of the study
This study is particularly important in the context of the rapidly 
emerging view among both academics and practitioners that a new 
reporting model is required to integrate both financial measures and 
leading indicators of performance in order to enhance investors’ 
understanding of firm operations (see for example, FASB, 2001; Eccles et 
al., 2001; ICAEW, 2003).  It is possible that in the context of the growing 
interest in intellectual capital reporting, regulations may be promulgated 
in the future.  Therefore, an understanding of the relationship between 
the cost of capital and intellectual capital disclosure can provide an 
economic basis for evaluating the costs and benefits of enhanced 
disclosure of intellectual capital information.  Understanding the costs 
and benefits of disclosure is important for the standard-setting process 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan, 2006).  The study also provides 
insights into the categories of intellectual capital disclosures that are likely 
to be more relevant in influencing the cost of capital, and thus provide 
managers with insights into which disclosures to focus on.  If managers 
believe a commitment to increased intellectual capital disclosure is 
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beneficial through a reduction in the cost of capital, they would likely 
have incentives to improve disclosure of the information type.  
The study contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, it 
adds to the limited existing body of literature: on the extent of intellectual 
capital disclosures in annual reports of UK firms (Williams, 2001; 
Vandemaele et al., 2005; Bozzolan et al., 2005; Unerman et al., 2007); 
and on the association between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital 
(Botosan; 1997; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; Kristandl and Bontis, 
2007).  Second, it provides the first evidence on the relationship between 
the cost of capital and intellectual capital disclosure in the context of the 
UK.  Third, unlike previous studies that examine aggregate disclosure, 
this study disaggregates disclosure into intellectual capital and financial 
disclosure and investigates the question of whether intellectual capital 
disclosure and financial disclosure are independently associated with 
the cost of equity capital.  Disaggregating disclosure into financial and 
intellectual capital information may reveal valuable additional insights 
that are likely to be concealed by using aggregate disclosures.  In this 
respect, it contributes to the literature by incorporating in the analysis, 
an important dimension of the information environment relating to 
the key value-creating drivers in the firm, and therefore likely to have 
significant influence on the cost of equity capital.  Fourth, the study splits 
intellectual capital into its three categories and examines whether these 
categories are independently associated with the cost of capital.  This 
helps the understanding of the key categories of intellectual capital that 
may be contributing to influencing the cost of capital.  Fifth, it explores 
how intellectual capital interacts with financial disclosure to affect the 
cost of capital.  Investigating the interaction effects of different types of 
disclosure on the cost of equity capital offers greater insights into the 
disclosure-cost of capital relationship, and this is another novel feature 
of this study.  
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Structure of the report
The rest of the report is structured as follows.  Following this 
introductory chapter, the literature review on intellectual capital 
reporting is reviewed in chapter two.  In chapter three, the literature on 
the relationship between cost of capital and disclosure is reviewed and 
discussed.  Chapter four describes the research method used.  Chapter 
five presents the descriptive statistics relating to cost of capital of UK 
firms and the extent of both financial disclosure and intellectual capital 
disclosure.  In chapter six, results of the relationship between disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital are presented and discussed.  Finally, chapter 
seven presents the concluding remarks, including the implications of the 
study, the limitations and possible avenues for further research.
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Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature on intellectual capital reporting.  It 
highlights the definitions of intellectual capital, the weaknesses of the 
traditional reporting model and why intellectual capital reporting has 
become so important in today’s economy.  Additionally, a brief review of 
some of the empirical literature on intellectual capital reporting and of 
the motivations for intellectual capital reporting is provided.  The review 
is important to provide an understanding of the role of intellectual capital 
reporting as well as the state of intellectual capital reporting.  Finally, 
the chapter closes with a summary and conclusions.  
The concept of intellectual capital
A wide range of definitions for intellectual capital have been 
suggested in the literature.  Such definitions vary in focus, from personal 
attributes, to organisational attributes (Mouritsen, 1998), to knowledge 
that can be used to create value (Stewart, 1997).  Stewart (1997) also 
views intellectual capital as the sum of everything residing in a company 
giving rise to competitive edge in the marketplace.  CIMA (2001) and 
Marr and Schiuma (2001) probably provide the most comprehensive 
definitions when they define intellectual capital as:
…the possession of knowledge and experience, professional 
knowledge and skill, good relationships, and technological 
capacities, which when applied will give organisations competitive 
advantage.  (CIMA, 2001, p. 2)
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…the group of knowledge assets that are attributed to an 
organisation and most significantly contribute to an improved 
competitive position of this organisation by adding value to defined 
key stakeholders.  (Marr and Schiuma, 2001)
A key feature of the definitions of intellectual capital is that 
they recognise the link between intellectual capital and the structure 
and performance of an organisation.  They reflect the uniqueness of 
intellectual capital to individual firms in enhancing their competitive 
advantage.
Whilst there is a wide range of definitions, there seems to be broad 
consensus that intellectual capital comprises three major categories: 
human capital, structural capital and relational capital (Guthrie and 
Petty, 2000; Lev and Zambon, 2003; Boedker et al., 2005).  This 
is the classification used in this study (see Appendix one).  Human 
capital is recognised as an important firm resource and is viewed as 
including training, experience, judgement, intelligence, relationships 
and insights of individual managers and workers in the firm (Marr and 
Schiuma, 2001; Marr et al., 2004; Sonnier, 2008).  It therefore captures 
the knowledge, professional skills, experience and innovativeness of 
employees within an organisation.  Wright et al. (1998) argue that 
human capital is important because it provides the means by which firms 
enhance their competitive advantage in the market place.  Structural 
capital consists of the structures and processes employees develop and 
deploy in order to be productive, effective and innovative (Boedker et 
al., 2005).  This includes, for example, patents, organisational culture, 
management philosophy, new product development, information 
systems and processes.  Relational capital captures the knowledge of 
market channels, customer and supplier relationships, and governmental 
or industry networks.  Hence, it relates to the organisation’s relationships 
with external stakeholders be they suppliers, customers or others (Guthrie 
et al., 2007; Marr et al., 2004).
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Intellectual capital reporting and the capital markets
According to Lev and Zambon (2003), economic development in 
recent years has been characterised by continuous innovation, the spread 
of digital and communication technologies, the relevance of network 
forms of organisation, and the prevalence of soft, intangible and human 
factors.  Firms operating in competitive, global markets recognise that 
the traditional reliance on tangible assets as value drivers, has been 
supplemented - or even superseded - by softer, intangible asset forms. 
Hence, for most organisations, intellectual capital is now recognised 
as an integral part of the firm’s value-creating processes (Bukh, 2003; 
Holland, 2003).  
However, whilst intellectual capital is considered a major 
contributor in the value-creating processes in the firm (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007), the costs involved with these intangible assets are either 
immediately expensed in the financial statements or arbitrarily amortised, 
and therefore are not adequately reflected in the financial statements. 
For example, the ‘new’ intangibles such as employee competencies, 
customer relationships and computer and administrative systems are 
not recognised in the traditional financial reporting model.  Although 
regulatory reporting requirements require traditional intangibles such as 
brand equity, patents and trademarks to be incorporated in the financial 
accounts, they are only recognised if they meet some stringent criteria 
(Holland, 2006; Guthrie et al., 2007).  Consequently, the book values 
of firms are poorly related to the market values (Holland, 2003; Beattie 
and Thomson, 2004).  For example, Lev (2001) documents an increase 
in the mean market-to-book ratio from 1.0 in 1977 to 6.0 in 2000 for 
the S&P500 firms.  Gu and Lev (2004) also show an average market-
to-book ratio of 4.5 for the S&P500 firms in the year 2003.  Similarly, 
Beattie and Thomson (2004) reveal that the mean market-to-book value 
for FTSE 100 firms to be 2.52 for the year 2002/2003.  These results 
indicate a substantial gap between book and market values of firms.  
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In the light of the evidence on the growing gap between market 
and book values of firms, it has been argued that the traditional financial 
reporting model has become of limited relevance to investors because it 
fails to reflect information about a wide range of value-creating intangible 
assets (Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Barsky et 
al., 2003).  The Jenkins Report (AICPA, 1994, p. 80) also suggests that: 
...a large part of the immediate problem… is the limited usefulness 
of today’s financial statements.  They do not, for example, 
reflect information-age assets, such as information, capacity for 
innovation, and human resources.  As a consequence, they have 
been a declining proportion of the information inputs to investors’ 
decision making...
Bukh (2003) argues that the traditional reporting model is not 
able to cope adequately with the reporting requirements of the new 
economy firms which rely heavily on investment in intangible assets. 
This failure by the financial reporting model to reflect investments in 
intangibles (intellectual capital) has given rise to increasing information 
asymmetry between firms and users (Rylander et al., 2000; Barth 
et al., 2001; Holland, 2003) which has increased opportunities for 
moral hazard, adverse selection and other opportunistic behaviour by 
managers (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Holland, 2006).  Consequently, 
this has caused concerns within the capital market on the ability and 
relevance of the accounting numbers reported in the financial reports 
for making economic decisions (Barth et al., 2001).  This has further 
been exacerbated by post-Enron concerns about the veracity of financial 
statements and the general downturn in the global economy (Barsky et 
al., 2003; Guthrie et al., 2007).  Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) and Lev 
(2001) contend that reporting of investments in intellectual capital in 
the firm is an important way of bridging this information asymmetry 
gap between managers and outside investors.
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Empirical studies of intellectual capital reporting 
The increasing importance of intellectual capital for business 
enterprises in fostering competitive advantage and value, coupled with 
the perceived limited value-relevance of traditional financial reports has 
led to increased calls from different constituents for improved intellectual 
capital reporting by firms in order to support investors’ decision-making 
processes (see for example, Wallman, 1995; FASB, 2001; ICAEW, 2003; 
Holland, 2006; ASB, 2007).  Wallman (1995), for example, contends 
that:
We cannot have financial reporting and disclosure constraints 
that slow the pace of progress in capital markets, decrease the rate 
of reduction in the cost of capital, or limit innovation.  (p. 89)
Consistent with this, Beattie (1999, p. 78) calls for firms to report 
externally on the measurement and management of intellectual capital. 
Similarly, Beattie and Thomson (2004) argue that the business reporting 
model needs to expand beyond the traditional financial reporting model 
in order to accommodate intellectual capital and meet the information 
needs of the capital market.  
Some authors (see for example, Rylander et al., 2000; Abdel-Khalik, 
2003) suggest an extension of the balance sheet with complementary 
balance sheets, or a supplementary set of elements in reporting to 
acknowledge forms of capital that cannot be measured in financial terms, 
to recognise intellectual capital in financial reports.  However, Cañibano 
et al. (2000) argue that the cost associated with a radical change in the 
accounting system to make it more value-relevant is unaffordable and that 
the sensible approach towards the enhancement of financial statements 
is to encourage voluntary intellectual capital disclosure.  This view is 
shared by others (for example, DATI, 2002; Beattie and Thomson, 2007) 
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contending that the opportunity to report intellectual capital in narrative 
format already exists within corporate annual reports.  
In response to the increased calls for improved intellectual capital 
disclosures, the extent to which intellectual capital information is 
disclosed in annual reports has been examined by a number of studies 
during the last decade.  Such studies have examined the content of 
the disclosures made by firms with the aim of providing an overview 
of intellectual capital disclosure practices in annual reports (Guthrie 
and Petty, 2000; Guthrie et al., 2006, 2007; Unerman et al., 2007) 
and in certain cases examining the factors influencing intellectual 
capital disclosures (Bukh et al., 2005; Bozzolan et al., 2005; Li et al., 
2008).  Generally, the findings of these studies suggest that the level of 
intellectual capital disclosure is low and variable, but also improving over 
time.  Guthrie and Petty (2000) is one of the early pioneering studies to 
examine intellectual capital disclosure practices.  Employing a checklist 
developed from Sveiby’s (1997) model they show that intellectual capital 
disclosure by a sample of 20 Australian firms was low.  Brennan (2001) 
follows Guthrie and Petty (2000) and examines annual reports of 11 
knowledge-intensive firms in Ireland.  The findings reveal that intellectual 
capital assets were rarely reported in the annual reports.  Other studies 
using similar approach (for example, Bozzolan et al., 2003; April et al., 
2003) also show low disclosure of intellectual capital.
In a longitudinal study of the annual reports of 31 FTSE 100 
firms, Williams (2001) also documents low, but increasing intellectual 
capital disclosures.  Bukh et al. (2005) examine prospectuses of Danish 
IPOs for the period 1990-2001 rather than annual reports.  They show 
a substantial increasing trend in the disclosure of intellectual capital 
information over the period.  Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) document 
similar results.  They examined annual reports of the top 30 listed firms 
in Sri Lanka for the period 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 and observe an 
increase in intellectual capital disclosure.  Similarly, Vandermaele et al. 
(2005) conduct a study of intellectual capital disclosure practices in the 
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Netherlands, Sweden and UK.  They document an increasing trend in 
all the three countries over the 1998 to 2000 three year period.  More 
recently, Guthrie et al. (2007) investigate the intellectual capital reporting 
practices in Australia, Hong Kong and document low amounts of 
intellectual capital information in annual reports in both countries.  In 
a UK study, Unerman et al. (2007) show substantial intellectual capital 
disclosures even in sectors in which intellectual capital is not expected 
to be a significant value driver, such as real estate, retail and utilities.  
Motivations for intellectual capital reporting
A number of explanations have been provided in the literature to 
explain why firms might voluntarily measure and report intellectual 
capital.  Guthrie et al. (1999) classify these incentives into those 
relating to the internal activities of the firm and those relating to the 
external environment that impacts the firm.  From the perspective of 
the internal environment, measuring and reporting intellectual capital 
is said to benefit the firm via increased operational efficiency, improved 
employee morale and motivation, and better resource allocation with 
the firm (Flamholtz and Main, 1999; Guthrie et al., 1999).  In the 
context of the external environment, the overriding incentive for firms 
to engage in voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital is to ‘render the 
invisible visible’ to external users of information (Cooper and Sherer, 
1984; Roos and Roos, 1997; Beattie and Thomson, 2007).  Reporting 
intellectual capital provides firms with an opportunity to: (1) establish 
trustworthiness with stakeholders and employ a valuable marketing 
tool (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 2001); (2) enhance external 
reputation (Toms, 2002; Guthrie et al., 2006); and (3) appear legitimate 
in the public eye and avoid costs from non-legitimacy (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2006; Beattie and Thomson, 2007).  A further benefit of 
intellectual capital reporting, and the one particularly relevant for 
this study, is that intellectual capital disclosure reduces information 
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asymmetry in the capital markets and lowers the cost of capital (Aboody 
and Lev, 2000; Lev, 2001).  This motivation is developed further in the 
next chapter of the report.
Summary 
This chapter reviews the literature on intellectual capital reporting. 
The concept of intellectual capital includes three categories: human; 
structural; and relational capital.  The reporting of intellectual capital 
information to the capital market is important because the traditional 
financial reporting model fails to fully reflect investments in intangible 
assets (that is intellectual capital), and therefore the value-relevance of 
financial statements has become limited.  Consequently, calls have been 
made for firms to provide information about investments in intangible 
assets to enhance investor understanding of the value-creating activities 
of firms.  Responding to these calls, there has been a growing number of 
studies investigating the extent to which firms report intellectual capital 
information.  A review of these studies suggests that intellectual capital 
disclosure is generally low and variable, although growing over time. 
An important finding of these studies is that although low, intellectual 
capital disclosures are now being made even by firms in sectors in which 
intellectual capital is not expected to be a significant value driver, such 
as real estate, retail and utilities.  One of the incentives for reporting 
intellectual capital by firms is to ‘make the invisible visible’ thereby 
reducing information asymmetries between the firm and investors and 
lowering the cost of capital.  
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Introduction
The literature review in the previous chapter shows intellectual capital 
reporting is still low and variable, but increasing over time.  One of 
the motivations for reporting intellectual capital is to lower the cost of 
capital via a reduction in information asymmetry.  This chapter reviews 
the literature on the cost of capital and intellectual capital disclosure to 
provide insights into the gaps that the current study addresses as well 
as opening avenues of future research.  First, the theoretical literature 
underpinning the relationship between the cost of capital and disclosure 
is discussed.  This is followed by a discussion of the empirical studies 
of the relationship between the cost of capital and disclosure, including 
some on intellectual capital disclosure.  Finally, a summary is presented.
Theoretical literature of disclosure and cost of capital
The notion of the link between disclosure and a firm’s cost of capital 
is supported by two related streams of theoretical literature (see Botosan, 
1997).  The basic assumption of these streams of the literature is that 
firms which provide more information about their activities reduce 
information asymmetry in the capital markets.  One stream argues that 
an environment of information asymmetry introduces adverse selection 
into the market (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Handa and Linn, 
1993).  Welker (1995) points out that such adverse selection leads to 
a reluctance by uninformed investors to trade shares in order to ‘price 
protect’ against potential losses from trading with other better informed 
market participants.  This reluctance to trade reduces market liquidity in 
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the firm’s shares (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Welker, 1995; Handa 
and Linn, 1993).  In this respect, firms that wish to raise capital will 
be forced to issue shares at a higher discount because investors pay less 
for shares with high transaction costs (Botosan, 2006).  Consequently, 
the share issue proceeds will be lower.  Handa and Linn (1993) argue 
that firms can lower the discount at which their shares are issued by 
improving disclosure to reduce information asymmetries arising either 
between the firm and outside investors or between buyers and sellers of 
the firm’s shares.  Amihud and Mendelson (1986) also suggest that firms 
with larger bid-ask spreads have higher cost of capital, and by disclosing 
more information they reduce the bid-ask spreads.  Similarly, Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) and Easley and O’Hara (2004) contend that by 
improving disclosure, firms enhance the liquidity of their shares thereby 
attracting increased demand for the shares, which increases share prices. 
Bloomfield and Wilks (2000), in their experimental study, also document 
that greater disclosure of information about the firm leads investors to 
trade shares at relatively higher prices, hence providing greater liquidity 
of the firm’s shares.  
The second stream of the literature suggests that greater disclosure 
results in a reduction of the estimation risk associated with investors’ 
assessments of a share’s return or payoff distribution (Botosan, 2006). 
The logic is that because investors estimate the parameters of return on a 
firm’s share on the basis of available information, an increase in disclosure 
allows investors to better estimate share returns.  This consequently lowers 
the required rate of return (Barry and Brown, 1985; Handa and Linn, 
1993; Coles et al., 1995).  Barry and Brown (1985) document support 
for this argument by modelling the premium that investors demand for 
bearing information risk in an environment of information asymmetry. 
They show that shares for which relatively little information exists have 
relatively higher systematic risk (or non-diversifiable risk).  Handa and 
Linn (1993) also show, using the Arbitrage Pricing Model that an investor 
attributes more systematic risk to shares with low information than to 
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shares with high information leading to lower demand and prices for 
the shares.  Lambert et al. (2007) consider the quality of information 
as important in aligning firms and investors with respect to capital 
investments.  They argue that higher information quality affects not 
only investors’ perception of a firm’s future cash flows, but also enables 
investors to affect the firm’s real decisions and future cash flows.  This 
lowers the information risk premium resulting in lower expected return 
by investors.  In summary, firms increasing disclosure reduce the required 
rate of return demanded by uninformed investors due to their uncertainty 
about the firm and this reduces the cost of capital.  
In today’s competitive environment, where intellectual capital plays 
a key role in the value-creating processes and activities of the firm (Bukh 
et al., 2005; Holland, 2006; Beattie and Thomson, 2007), the logic 
of these two streams of theoretical literature are particularly relevant 
for intellectual capital reporting.  As Aboody and Lev (2000) argue, 
the extent of information asymmetry between firms and investors for 
investments in intellectual capital is greater than that associated with 
other types of investments (physical and financial assets).  Empirical 
evidence is consistent with this notion.  For example, Barth et al. 
(2001) show that analyst coverage is significantly higher for firms with 
intensive investments in research and developments.  The main reason 
for this is that intellectual capital is more unique to a particular firm 
compared to physical and financial assets (Aboody and Lev, 2000) and 
contrary to investments in physical and financial assets, intellectual 
capital reporting is not regulated.  Francis and Schipper (1999) argue 
that this is compounded by the fact that accounting measurement and 
reporting rules mandate that most investments in intellectual capital are 
immediately expensed in the period in which they are incurred.  Hence 
most investments in intellectual capital are not fully reported in the 
firm’s financial statements.  Consequently, whilst investors are regularly 
informed about changes in physical and financial assets via mandated 
annual and interim reports, there is relatively scarce public information 
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about intellectual capital investments.  This creates a complication for 
investors when undertaking firm valuation because they have little or 
no information about the productivity and value changes of intellectual 
capital investments (Barth et al., 2001; Lev, 2001).
In the context of the above, Lev (2001) posits that the reporting of 
intellectual capital should result in a lower cost of capital.  Disclosing 
information about intellectual capital investments provides investors 
with a more forward-looking view of the firm (Williams, 2001; Beattie 
and Thomson, 2007; Guthrie et al., 2007).  This improves the market’s 
understanding of a firm’s value-creating processes and activities as well 
as the economic risks attached to the firm’s shares.  Such understanding 
leads to improvement in capital market efficiency, which reduces the 
uncertainty premium required by investors when making decisions 
to invest in a firm (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Lev, 2001).  Garcia-Ayuso 
(2002) also notes that an understanding of investments in intellectual 
capital by the capital market is likely to reduce stock price volatility and 
therefore the cost of capital.  
In summary, failure to report intellectual capital externally will have 
the effect that investors will lack information on the development of a 
firm’s intangible resources.  This lack of information leads to investors’ 
risk perceptions being higher (Lev, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
The higher risk perception manifests itself in systematic undervaluation 
of firm’s shares by investors (Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lev, 2001). 
Thus, from a theoretical standpoint, firms improving their disclosure of 
intellectual capital information can lower their cost of capital by reducing 
information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) and lowering 
information risk (Handa and Linn, 1993; Verrecchia, 2001).  
Empirical studies of disclosure and cost of capital
Drawing from the above theoretical literature, a number of studies 
have examined empirically the relationship between the cost of capital 
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and different disclosure types.  Examples of disclosure types include: 
aggregate disclosure (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002); social disclosures 
(Richardson and Welker, 2001); timely disclosures (Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005); and more recently, 
intellectual capital disclosures (Singh and Van der Zahn, 2007; Kristandl 
and Bontis, 2007).  These studies are discussed in the following sections.
Voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital
Botosan (1997) was the first to empirically explore the relationship 
between the cost of capital and aggregate disclosure in 122 firms operating 
in the machinery manufacturing industry.  She documents a negative 
relationship between the cost of capital and disclosure for firms with a 
lower analyst following.  The analysis indicates that firms with greater 
disclosure could reduce their cost of capital by about 2% relative to firms 
with lower disclosure.  In contrast, Botosan (1997) shows no relationship 
between disclosure and the cost of capital for firms with high analyst 
following.  She suggests that this could be because public disclosures play 
a more significant role in the communication process for firms with low 
than high analyst following.  Hail (2002) also investigates a sample of 
73 Swiss firms to determine whether they reduce their cost of capital by 
increased annual voluntary disclosure.  Consistent with Botosan (1997), 
the results show a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
the cost of capital.  Hail (2002) reveals that high-disclosing firms enjoy 
about 1.8% to 2.4% cost advantage over low-disclosing firms.  Francis 
et al. (2005) extend the investigation to an international setting.  Using 
a sample of firms from 34 countries, they also document that firms with 
greater external financing needs disclose more information and that such 
expanded disclosure lowers their cost of capital.  
In an extension of Botosan (1997), Richardson and Welker (2001) 
examine the impact of two types of disclosure (social and financial 
disclosures) on the cost of capital in Canadian firms.  Whilst, they 
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document a negative relationship between the cost of capital and financial 
disclosures, they find a positive relationship with social disclosures, 
suggesting that firms that disclose greater social information are penalised 
by the market.  They suggest that this could be a result of: (1) biases in 
social reporting with firms experiencing higher social costs disclosing 
more positive than negative information for self-promotion; (2) the 
market holding different views on the pay-offs of investments in social 
responsibility; or (3) the type of data used which was collected in a period 
of recession.  Botosan and Plumlee (2002) also extend Botosan’s (1997) 
study and explore the relationship between cost of capital and annual 
report disclosures, timely disclosures (quarterly and other published 
reports), and investor relations activities.  Whilst they also document that 
the cost of capital decreases with increased annual financial disclosures, 
their findings show that the relationship between the cost of capital and 
timely disclosures is positive.  Further analysis shows that firms providing 
greater timely disclosures have a cost of capital which is about 1.3 
percentage points higher relative to firms providing lower levels of timely 
disclosures.  Botosan and Plumlee (2002) suggest that timely disclosures 
may increase volatility of share prices and hence increase the cost of 
capital because they attract transient investors who trade aggressively on 
short-term earnings.  In terms of investor relations disclosures, Botosan 
and Plumlee (2002) find no evidence of an association between the cost 
of capital and investor relations activities.  
Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) criticise Botosan and Plumlee’s 
(2002) study arguing that the positive relationship documented for 
timely disclosures derives from an inappropriate measure of timely 
disclosure.  They argue that using quarterly disclosures can only provide 
a partial picture of events in a firm.  In a UK context, they developed 
their measure of quality (rather than quantity) timely disclosures from the 
Regulatory News Service (RNS) of the London Stock Exchange, where 
firms are required to make disclosures of any price sensitive information. 
They document that timely disclosures are negatively related to the cost 
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of capital for firms with aggressive accounting policies than for those 
with conservative accounting policies.  In a more recent study, Espinosa 
and Trombetta (2007) also document a negative relationship between 
disclosure and cost of capital for firms with aggressive accounting policy.
Whilst the above studies attempt to measure both disclosure and 
cost of capital in a somewhat direct way, others employ proxy measures 
of either the cost of capital or disclosure.  For example, Welker (1995) 
employs analyst ratings of overall disclosure policy and demonstrates 
that firms with higher disclosure ratings have, on average, lower bid-
ask spreads (an indirect cost of capital measure).  Similarly, Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) investigate the consequences of commitments to 
increased disclosures.  They find that German firms switching from 
local GAAP to IFRS or US GAAP (their measure of commitment to 
increased disclosure) have lower bid-ask spreads.  Cuijpers and Buijink 
(2005) also find similar results, but only for those with greater analyst 
following, whilst Daske (2006) fails to find evidence of a reduction in 
cost of capital for German firms switching from local GAAP to IFRS/
US GAAP.
Intellectual capital disclosure and the cost of capital
Except for two recent studies by Singh and Van der Zahn (2007) 
and Kristandl and Bontis (2007), to date no other study has explicitly 
considered the cost of capital effects of information asymmetry of 
investments in intellectual capital.  Indeed the results of these two studies 
suggest that the relationship between intellectual capital and the cost of 
capital is not clear, thus warranting further research on this issue.  Singh 
and Van der Zahn (2007) examine the association between underpricing 
and intellectual capital disclosures amongst Singapore initial public 
offerings (IPOs).  Contrary to theoretical predictions, they find a positive 
association between underpricing and the extent of intellectual capital 
disclosure.  However, this study uses under-pricing in IPOs rather than 
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the cost of capital directly, and therefore, it is difficult to conclude that 
intellectual capital information influences the cost of capital.  In addition, 
the use of IPO firms means that the results may not be applicable to 
non-IPO firms because by the nature, IPO firms have greater uncertainty 
and have no track record and therefore their cost of capital is likely to be 
higher.  Kristandl and Bontis (2007) investigate the effects of intellectual 
capital disclosure on the cost of capital of 95 listed companies in Austria, 
Germany, Sweden and Denmark.  They classify voluntary disclosure into 
historical information and forward-looking information and find that 
the cost of capital decreases with forward-looking (intellectual capital) 
information but increases with historical (financial) information.  The 
problem with the study is that it employs only a limited number of 
intellectual capital information items and the financial information 
only includes stock market information.  Additionally, the study does 
not consider the effects of: interacting financial and intellectual capital 
disclosure; and the individual intellectual capital disclosure categories, 
on the cost of capital.  Another important problem is that the study uses 
Gebhardt et al.’s (2001) model to estimate the cost of equity capital.  The 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) model has been criticised for producing cost of 
capital estimates which are not related to risk in a reasonable manner, 
thus calling into question their validity as a proxy for the cost of equity 
capital (see Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Botosan, 2006).
Although there is little research investigating directly the relationship 
between the cost of capital and intellectual capital disclosure, a number 
of studies examine whether specific intellectual capital indicators are 
positively related to share prices.  For, example, it has been documented 
that share prices are positively associated with capitalised software 
development costs (Aboody and Lev, 1998), customer satisfaction (Ittner 
and Larcker, 1998), brand equity (Barth et al., 2001) and estimates of 
R&D assets (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996).  Ely and Waymire (1999) also 
examine the relationship between intangible assets and share prices under 
an environment which allows considerable flexibility for managers to 
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capitalise such assets.  They find that the coefficient relating earnings to 
share prices decreases with the level of capitalised intangibles.  They argue 
that investors may perceive that managers overstate earnings through 
intangible assets capitalisation.  However, they find that when intangibles 
are reported separately (disaggregated) the relationship between summary 
balance sheet measures and share prices are strengthened, supporting the 
view that non-financial information complements financial information. 
More recently, Dumay and Tull (2007) examine whether the disclosure 
of elements of intellectual capital through ‘price-sensitive’ disclosures 
to the Australian Stock Exchange affects a firm’s share prices.  They find 
that such disclosures, particularly internal capital, affect the cumulative 
abnormal returns of a firm.  In general, these studies show that intellectual 
capital information influences the short-term trading activities of market 
participants.  However, the effect of intellectual capital information on 
the investors’ long-term view of the firm is not well understood.  
Summary 
This chapter provides a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between the cost of capital and disclosure. 
Whilst the review indicates a consensus from the theoretical literature 
that disclosure reduces the cost of capital via a reduction in adverse 
selection and the estimation risk associated with investors’ assessment 
of the return from a firm’s share, empirically, the results are generally 
mixed.  Some studies document a negative relationship, while others 
show a positive relationship and/or no relationship at all.  Reasons for 
these mixed results have included measurement difficulties associated 
with both cost of capital and disclosure, and the richness in terms of 
disclosure environments employed in most previous studies (Richardson 
and Welker, 2001).  Second, the results suggest that different types of 
disclosure have differing effects on the cost of capital.  Consequently, 
Botosan (2006) calls for further research in order to understand more 
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about the relationship between the cost of capital and disclosure.  Hence 
this study contributes to the debate on the cost of capital effects of 
information asymmetry by investigating the relationship between the 
cost of capital and intellectual capital disclosure.  
This study differs from previous studies in a number of dimensions. 
First, unlike previous studies that tend to examine aggregate disclosure, 
this study discriminates between intellectual capital disclosures and 
financial disclosures.  The decision to distinguish between intellectual 
capital and financial disclosures derives from the perceived weaknesses in 
the existing financial reporting model in providing investors with useful 
information coupled with the perceived importance of intellectual capital 
information in firm valuations by investors.  Investments in intellectual 
capital are unique to a specific firm and their reporting is unregulated 
(Aboody and Lev, 2000), thus making the information asymmetry 
between the firm and investors greater for intellectual capital investments 
than for physical and financial investments.  The distinction therefore 
allows not only a determination of whether intellectual capital disclosure 
is independently related to the cost of capital, but also to ascertain its 
interaction effects with  financial disclosures on the cost of capital.  It 
has been suggested that intellectual capital combines and interacts with 
traditional physical and financial assets to create value in ways which 
are unique to individual firms.  Additionally, previous studies have not 
examined the independent effects of the three categories of intellectual 
capital (structural, human and relational) on the cost of capital.  As 
Holland (2003) suggests, the different intellectual capital categories 
combine and at times interact with each other to create value in terms 
of known cash flows, and in terms of growing the current business.  
Intellectual capital also constitutes an environment in which 
disclosure is not as rich as other disclosures because of its uniqueness 
to specific firms and its unregulated nature, thus it provides a basis to 
differentiate firms in terms of the level of disclosure.  Finally, whilst there 
are studies (Amir and Lev, 1996; Ittner and Larcker, 1998) examining 
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the relationship between specific intellectual capital indicators and 
share prices, the current study is different because it instead focuses on 
the cost of capital and thus reflects the long-term effects of intellectual 
capital on the firm (Christensen et al., 2007).  While share price studies 
consider the short-term price response to firm news via the identification 
of the event days and assumes that there has been no leakage of news to 
the market, cost of capital studies are not sensitive to the identification 
of specific event dates, and do not assume non-leakage of news to the 
market (Christensen et al., 2007).  
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Introduction
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether firms that 
publish greater intellectual capital disclosures benefit in terms of a lower 
cost of equity capital.  In this chapter, the research methods used to 
address this objective are described.  First, the selection process of the 
sample of listed firms examined in the study is discussed, followed by 
a description of the process by which the main data for the analysis is 
collected.  This includes a discussion of how intellectual capital disclosure, 
voluntary financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital measures are 
determined.  Finally, the chapter closes with a summary.   
Sample selection
The data used in the analysis is obtained from I/B/E/S Datastream 
as well as from the annual reports of a sample of 126 UK firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  The selection of these firms 
is as follows.  As at March 2008, there were 3,285 firms fully listed 
on the LSE.  From this list, all overseas firms, Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) listed firms and recently listed firms were excluded from 
the sample.  The resultant population size was 522 firms distributed in 
15 consolidated industry groupings (see column one of Table 4.1).  To 
select the sample firms for the study, proportionate stratified sampling 
was applied (Moser and Kalton, 1996).  In this respect, the sampling 
was systematically conducted on an industry basis by selecting one firm 
from every three firms.  The resultant sample was 163 firms (see column 
two of Table 4.1).  
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Since the cost of equity capital estimates are computed using 
data provided by I/B/E/S Datastream, the list of the 163 firms was 
submitted to Thomson’s Datastream for the requisite data.  Following 
this procedure, 16 firms were eliminated from the final sample because 
of missing or insufficient data from Datastream.  A further 21 firms 
were eliminated because the data failed to meet some of the restrictions 
imposed by the formula used to compute the cost of equity capital (see 
discussion on measurement of cost of capital below).  This resulted in 
a sample of 126 firms for use in this study (see column three of Table 
4.1).  Table 4.1 provides the breakdown of the final sample by industry 
classification.
Table 4.1 Sample composition by industry 
Industry
Population 
size 
Initial 
sample 
size 
Final sample 
size
No. No. No. %
Biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 40 13 10 7.9
Information technology 60 19 13 10.3
Media and publishing 45 14 12 9.5
Business service providers 83 26 22 17.4
Telecommunications services 18 6 6 4.8
Banks and insurance 51 15 14 11.1
Food and beverages 22 7 7 5.6
Electronic and electrical equipment 45 14 5 4.0
Retailing 20 6 6 4.8
Utility 36 11 10 7.9
Engineering 10 3 3 2.4
Aerospace and defence 11 3 3 2.4
Chemicals 29 9 3 2.4
Real estate 40 13 8 6.3
Mining 12 4 4 3.2
Total number of firms 522 163 126 100.0
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Data collection and variable measurements
Data for the sample of firms was collected from two main sources. 
For the level of disclosure (both intellectual capital and financial 
disclosures), the data was collected from the published annual reports 
for the financial year ends between March 2004 and February 2005. 
The period was deliberately chosen to reduce the possibility that firm 
disclosures may have been influenced by the Operating Financial Review 
(OFR) and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
which were to become mandatory from period beginning 2005.  For 
measuring the cost of equity capital, the project used share prices and 
analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts provided by Thomson’s Datastream. 
The share price data was collected at the annual release date, whilst the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts are those that were released after the annual 
report release date.  The rationale for this is that analysts would have 
analysed and incorporated the annual report information into their 
revised earnings forecasts.  
Measuring the level of disclosure
For the purposes of this study, two measures of voluntary disclosure 
are required: intellectual capital disclosure and financial disclosure.  The 
focus is on voluntary disclosure because most firms provide regulated 
disclosures, thus regulated disclosures would not differentiate firms in 
terms of disclosure.  Differentiating firms is a necessary criterion for 
a study of this nature.  Whilst the main theme of the study relates to 
intellectual capital disclosure, financial disclosures are also measured to 
allow for investigating whether intellectual capital disclosures interact 
with financial disclosures to affect the cost of capital.  
In order to measure the level of both intellectual capital and financial 
disclosures, this research project uses the annual report as the source of 
data.  It is the main channel by which firms communicate with investors 
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and other stakeholders (Gray et al., 2005; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Guthrie 
et al., 2007) and firms use it as a public relations document (Guthrie 
et al., 2007).  In the context of the capital market, and therefore this 
study, it has been shown in the literature that the annual report is used 
by investors.  For example, Eng and Teo (2000) provide evidence to 
suggest that analysts revise their earnings forecasts after the release of 
annual reports suggesting that they provide additional information to 
analysts.  Hope (2003) also shows that annual report disclosure levels are 
positively related to the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts suggesting 
that the annual report provides useful information to analysts.  
Disclosure of both intellectual capital and financial information is 
measured using a disclosure index developed from a content analysis of 
annual reports.  The approach implemented in this study involves the 
use of a dichotomous procedure, where a particular information item is 
awarded one (for yes) and zero (for no) if it is disclosed or not disclosed, 
respectively.  The level of disclosure for each firm is then calculated as 
an index by dividing the sum of disclosures (all the ones) by the total 
number of items scored (total count of all the ones and zeros).
In using the disclosure index approach, it is first necessary to develop 
a checklist of items of information that firms disclose or may disclose 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991).  In this study, a checklist comprising 
both intellectual capital and financial disclosure items was developed. 
The items of intellectual capital information were all drawn from Li et 
al. (2008).  Li et al. (2008) developed the most comprehensive list of 
intellectual capital information comprising 61 items from a review of 
several previous studies (such as Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Bozzolan et al., 
2003; Beattie and Thomson, 2004) as well as statements of best practice. 
In line with previous research (see Guthrie et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; 
Sonnier, 2008) and the objectives of this study, the intellectual capital 
disclosure items were divided into human intellectual capital, structural 
intellectual capital and relational intellectual capital.  
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For the financial disclosures, the list of items drew heavily from 
Gray et al. (1995) who also presented the most comprehensive list of 
disclosure items.  Given that the items of information required for this 
study are voluntary in nature, Gray et al.’s (1995) list was adjusted to 
take account of any mandatory items as well as to remove intellectual 
capital items in the list of financial disclosure.  This resulted in a list of 
35 main financial disclosure items for the study.  The final total list (both 
intellectual capital and financial) of items in the checklist comprised 96 
items.  The final checklist is included in Appendix one.  
Measurement of cost of equity capital
In this study, the focus is on the cost of equity capital, rather than 
the cost of debt, because firms in the UK primarily use equity financing 
(Lee et al., 2006).  The cost of equity capital is a measure of the discount 
rate that the market applies to a firm’s expected future cash flows to 
determine the current stock price (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Botosan, 
2006; Lee et al., 2006).  
There are a number of alternative methods that have been developed 
in the literature to estimate the cost of equity capital.  Botosan (2006) 
classifies these into two classes.  One class of methods, such as the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), uses predetermined priced risk factors 
to yield cost of equity capital estimates.  However, Botosan (2006) 
argues that CAPM based estimates are not useful for investigating the 
relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital because 
they do not clearly provide for the role of information.  
The second class of methods estimates the cost of equity capital by 
calculating the internal rate of return that equates the market’s expectation 
of future cash flows to current stock price.  The main methods in this 
class are: (1) the residual income (RIV) model (Gebhardt et al., 2001); 
(2) the abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model (Gode and Mohanram, 
2003); and (3) the price-earnings growth (PEG) model (Easton, 2004). 
Mangena-Pike (Nov 09).indd   35 17/03/2010   14:30:28
36 intelleCtual Capital disClosure praCtiCes and eFFeCts on the Cost oF equity Capital: uK evidenCe
All these methods make use of current share price and analysts’ forecasts 
of earnings in estimating the cost of equity capital and therefore are 
suitable for this study of the relationship between cost of equity capital 
and disclosure.  This is because in making earnings forecasts, analysts 
use available information about the firm (Lee et al., 2006).
The choice of the method to use depends on the application (Lee 
et al., 2006) and data availability (Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005).  In 
the context of research on the disclosure-cost of capital relationship, 
Cooper (2006) argues that the method used should not have a significant 
impact on the results.  He argues that it is the relative differences in the 
cost of capital estimates among firms, rather than the accuracy of the 
absolute measures of the cost of capital that matters.  This study uses 
the PEG model as developed by Easton (2004) (see Appendix two for 
further details).
There are a number of reasons for adopting the PEG model to 
estimate the cost of equity capital in this study.  First, the method has less 
onerous data requirements, and only requires I/B/E/S data on price and 
earnings growth to compute the cost of capital.  The second reason for 
using the PEG model is that some studies (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; 
Easton and Monahan, 2005) indicate that the cost of capital estimates 
obtainable from the three alternative approaches (RIV, AEG and PEG) 
are fairly similar and positively correlated, but the PEG model dominates 
the other approaches.  Additionally, Chen et al. (2004) also show in an 
international setting that the RIV model performs poorly in European 
countries, and that the AEG model is either inferior to, or equivalent 
with, the PEG model in all countries.  Finally, using the PEG model 
enables comparison of the estimates with those obtained by Lee et al. 
(2006) who also used the PEG model to compare the cost of capital of 
UK and European firms.  
Under the PEG model approach, the cost of equity capital is defined 
as the square root of the inverse of the price-earnings growth ratio as 
follows:
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Where:
r PEG = Cost of equity capital of the firm
eps2 = Mean value of all two-year-ahead analysts’ consensus earnings 
forecast after annual report release date
eps1 = Mean value of all one-year-ahead analysts’ consensus earnings 
forecast after annual report release date
P0 = Share price at annual report release date (time = 0)
The mean value of all one-year-ahead (eps1) and two-year-ahead (eps2) 
analysts’ earnings forecasts used for this study are those released after the 
annual report publication date.  The rationale for using forecasts made 
after the release of the annual report is that they potentially reflect the 
information disclosed in the annual report.  The share price (P0) is at 
the annual release date.  To calculate the cost of equity capital, consider 
for example, a firm with one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts of 24.58p and 27.43p, respectively, and a share price of 478.5p 
at the annual release date.  The cost of equity capital for the firm will 
be the square root of (27.43-24.58)/478.5, equalling 0.077176.  So 
the cost of equity capital will be approximately 7.72% for this firm.  It 
is important to note that to compute the cost of equity capital under 
the PEG model, the sample firms must have positive one-year-ahead 
and two-year-ahead consensus analysts’ earnings forecasts (see Easton, 
2004; Francis et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2006).  Additionally, the two-
year-ahead analysts’ forecasts must be greater than the one-year-ahead 
analysts’ forecasts.  This is a limitation of the PEG model because it 
biases the sample towards stable and less risky firms (Lee et al., 2006) 
and therefore may influence the results.  Given these restrictions and 
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also missing data, the sample for the study was reduced from 163 to 
126 firms (see Table 4.1).
Summary 
This chapter outlines the research methods for the research project. 
The study uses data from a sample of 126 UK firms listed on the 
LSE.  The process by which the level of voluntary disclosure for both 
intellectual capital and financial information was measured is described. 
The disclosure index, which is a well established approach that uses a 
dichotomous procedure to score the annual report is explained and its 
use is justified.  The chapter also discusses the use of the PEG model, 
developed by Easton (2004), to estimate the cost of equity capital. 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts and share prices are provided by Datastream.
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Introduction
The previous chapter describes the research methods used to collect data 
for this study.  This chapter presents the results of analysing disclosure 
and cost of capital data.  First, the characteristics of the sample firms 
are described.  Second, descriptive statistics for intellectual capital 
disclosures, financial disclosures and the cost of equity capital are 
presented.  Finally, a summary concludes the chapter.
Characteristics of sample firms in the study
The firm characteristics used to describe the sample are market 
capitalisation (firm size), beta (market risk), leverage (financial risk, 
measured as total debt to total assets), and market-to-book values 
(growth potential).  The data for these characteristics are drawn from the 
annual reports and the Risk Measurement Service Report published by 
the London Business School.  The statistics are presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Characteristics of sample firms
Firm 
characteristics Mean Median Std dev
25th 
Quartile
75th 
Quartile
Market value 
(£ million) 6,007.73 660.45 15,236.95 164.60 3,094.50
Beta 0.997 1.1015 0.306 0.783 1.233
Leverage 0.196 0.148 0.192 0.063 0.283
Market-to-book 1.874 2.412 29.996 1.441 3.660
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Table 5.1 shows that the average firm size, measured in terms of 
the market capitalisation, is about £6 billion.  The market capitalisation 
of firms in the upper (75th) and lower (25th) quartiles are £3.1 billion 
and £164.6 million, respectively.  The median market capitalisation is 
smaller than the mean at £660 million, but significantly higher than 
that of the lower quartile firms.  This suggests that the sample of firms 
also includes medium-sized firms.  The table also reveals that BETA, a 
measure of risk for the sample of firms in the study, is 0.997.  Firms in 
the upper and lower quartile have BETA estimates of 0.783 and 1.233, 
respectively.  The median of 1.015 is slightly greater than the mean 
suggesting that the sample includes some high risk firms.  
The mean leverage of the firms is about 19.6% consistent with the 
notion that UK firms generally do not rely heavily on debt financing 
(Lee et al., 2006).  The median, lower quartile and upper quartile are 
respectively 14.8%, 6.3% and 28.3%.  The fact that the median is lower 
than the mean indicates that the sample includes low and medium-geared 
firms.  Overall, firms in the sample are lowly geared consistent with the 
notion that UK firms rely more on equity capital than on debt (Lee et al., 
2006).  In terms of the market-to-book ratio, the mean is 1.874 which is 
lower than the 2.52 reported by Beattie and Thomson (2004), although 
the median of 2.412 is consistent.  The reason for this different may 
derive from the fact that Beattie and Thomson (2004) only examined 
firms in the FTSE 100 rather than a range of listed firms.
On the whole these statistics show that the sample of firms varies 
significantly in terms of risk, size, debt, and market-to-book values 
(variations as measured by the standard deviations).  This variation 
suggests that the sample of firms in the study cover a wide range of firms 
and therefore the results can potentially be generalised.  However, in 
generalising the results, there is a need to be cognisant of the fact that 
due to data restrictions imposed by the PEG model, some firms were 
excluded in the analysis.  
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Summary descriptive statistics for the disclosure 
scores
The disclosure scores are analysed at the overall and intellectual 
capital category disclosure levels as well as according to industry and firm 
size.  This is to help provide a better understanding of firms’ disclosure 
practices.  The summary descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Summary of disclosure scores for the sample
Panel A: Disclosure scores
Statistics
Intellectual capital disclosure
Voluntary 
financial 
disclosure 
%
Overall 
intellectual 
capital 
%
Human 
intellectual 
capital
%
Structural 
intellectual 
capital 
%
Relational 
intellectual 
capital 
%
Mean 70.1 74.6 73.7 62.3 46.2
Median 72.1 77.3 72.2 61.9 46.4
Std dev 11.5 11.3 14.2 15.8 9.5
25th Quartile 62.3 68.2 66.7 52.4 38.4
75th Quartile 78.7 81.8 83.3 72.6 53.9
Panel B: Distribution of disclosure scores
Score range
Overall 
intellectual 
capital
Human 
intellectual 
capital
Structural 
intellectual 
capital
Relational 
intellectual 
capital
Voluntary 
financial 
disclosure
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Under 20% 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.8 0 0.0
20% to <40% 1 0.8 0 0.0 3 2.4 10 7.9 41 32.5
40% to <60% 24 19.1 15 11.9 14 11.1 45 35.7 75 59.5
60% to <80% 74 58.7 64 50.8 64 50.8 48 38.1 10 8.0
80% to 100% 27 21.4 47 37.3 45 35.7 22 17.5 0 0.0
Total 126 100.0 126 100.0 126 100.0 126 100.0 126 100.0
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In general, the table indicates, contrary to other previous studies 
(Guthrie et al., 2007; White et al., 2007; Unerman et al., 2007), extensive 
disclosure of intellectual capital information in the annual reports of 
UK listed firms.  The extensive intellectual capital disclosures reported 
in this study, compared to findings of previous studies (such as Guthrie 
et al., 2007; White et al., 2007; Unerman et al., 2007) may derive from 
the different times of the research.  The data for this study is for the 
financial year periods 2004 and 2005; whist Unerman et al.’s (2007) 
data set was collected prior to 2004.  In this context, it may be argued 
that the extensive intellectual capital disclosure was a response to the 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) which was originally to become 
mandatory from April 2005.  
Panel A of Table 5.2 suggests that firms’ disclosures are generally 
consistent across all three categories of intellectual capital.  The overall 
intellectual capital disclosure mean of 70.1% is generally similar to the 
mean rating of each of the intellectual capital categories.  These results are 
supported by the high level of correlations among the three intellectual 
capital categories.  The Spearman correlations between human and 
structural intellectual capital, human and relational intellectual capital 
and, relational and structural intellectual capital are 0.560, 0.481 
and 0.637, respectively, and are highly significant (at 1% level or 
better).  However, as argued by Lang and Lundholm (1993), the fact 
that these correlations, although high, are less than one, suggests that 
these categories capture different aspects of a firm’s intellectual capital 
information.  
Whilst the means of human intellectual capital and structural 
intellectual capital are slightly higher than the overall mean score at 
74.6% and 73.7% respectively, the mean score for relational intellectual 
capital disclosure of 62.3% is moderately lower than the overall mean. 
It would appear that firms provide more disclosures in the human and 
structural capital categories compared to the relational capital category, 
suggesting that firms downplay the role of relational capital.  This is 
Mangena-Pike (Nov 09).indd   42 17/03/2010   14:30:29
43measures oF disClosure and Cost oF Capital
puzzling for two reasons.  First, in view of increasing global competition, 
one would have expected relational capital to be equally important and 
therefore reported as much as other intellectual capital categories.  It 
is possible, however, that firms consider relational intellectual capital 
competitively sensitive and may be concerned about revealing the 
information to competitors.  Second, Bozzolan et al. (2005) and 
Unerman et al. (2007) show, also in the context of the UK, that there is 
greater disclosure of relational capital information than for human and 
structural capital information.  The reason for the differences between 
these two studies and the current study may be due to the ways in which 
disclosure scores were developed.  Whilst this study uses a dichotomous 
approach (one if disclosed; zero if not disclosed), Unerman et al. (2007) 
counted instances of disclosure of an item to reflect the importance the 
firm attaches to the item.   
To gain a clearer picture of the level of intellectual capital reporting, 
the disclosure scores are grouped into five frequency groups (see Panel B, 
Table 5.2).  As the table shows, most firms (about 80%) disclosed over 
60% of the intellectual capital information items included in the study 
for overall, human and structural intellectual capital.  The percentage of 
firms disclosing over 60% of items reduces to about 55% in the relational 
intellectual capital category.  
Table 5.2 also compares the level of intellectual capital disclosures 
and financial disclosures.  The mean financial disclosure score of 46.2% 
is lower than for each of the intellectual capital disclosure scores.  This 
is surprising given that firms have been reporting financial information 
for many years.  There are at least three possible explanations for these 
results.  First, the approach used in this study to measure disclosure uses 
a dichotomous approach which does not take account of the details 
provided for each intellectual capital item disclosed.  Hence a firm that 
provides more detail about a specific item receives the same score as a 
firm that just mentions the item without necessarily providing details. 
This might have distorted the resultant disclosure scores.  Second, the 
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annual reports for this study were published in 2004 and 2005 and this 
was the time when the eventually repealed regulations for a mandatory 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) were to be introduced.  Given 
that the OFR is a heavily intellectual capital related document, it is 
possible that firms were already responding to forthcoming regulations. 
This logic is consistent with Gray and Roberts (1989) who show that 
UK firms anticipate changes in reporting requirements, and respond to 
such changes in their reporting practices.  Third, it is also possible that 
firms understand the limitations of financial information, and are aware 
that investors benefit more from intellectual capital information than 
financial information.  Finally, only voluntary financial disclosures are 
considered and therefore firms that disclose greater mandatory and less 
voluntary disclosures are penalised.  
Analysis of disclosure scores by industry 
Previous studies have shown that intellectual capital disclosure varies 
with industry (Bozzolan et al., 2005; Guthrie et al., 2007; Sonnier, 2008). 
The results for industry analysis are presented in Table 5.3.  Panel A of 
Table 5.3 indicates disclosure scores for each of the individual industries. 
An analysis of Panel A indicates high intellectual capital disclosure 
scores in banks and insurance, telecommunications services, media and 
publishing, biotech and pharmaceuticals, IT, aerospace and defence, 
business service providers and food and beverages.  This is expected 
because these industries are generally knowledge-based industries and 
are more likely to have more intellectual capital information to report.
Mangena-Pike (Nov 09).indd   44 17/03/2010   14:30:29
45measures oF disClosure and Cost oF Capital
Table 5.3 Descriptive disclosure scores by industry
Panel A: Analysis of disclosures by individual industry (mean scores)
Industry
Overall 
intellectual 
capital
%
Human 
intellectual 
capital 
% 
Structural 
intellectual 
capital
%
Relational 
intellectual 
capital 
%
Voluntary 
financial 
disclosure
%
Banks and insurance 75.3 77.9 76.6 71.4 45.6
Telecommunications 
services 72.7 71.9 75.0 71.4 48.9
Media and publishing 72.7 75.4 75.0 67.9 47.2
Biotech and 
Pharmaceuticals 71.8 74.1 73.9 67.6 48.5
IT 71.2 75.5 70.9 67.0 41.5
Aerospace and defence 70.5 66.7 79.6 66.7 54.9
Business service 
providers 70.1 75.8 73.9 61.0 43.4
Food and beverages 70.0 72.1 81.7 57.8 49.2
Engineering 69.9 72.0 75.0 63.5 48.9
Mining 69.9 75.8 72.2 61.9 51.8
Chemicals 68.8 75.8 81.5 50.8 41.9
Electronic and 
electrical equipment 67.9 74.5 77.8 52.4 44.7
Real estate 66.8 73.9 63.9 61.9 52.7
Utility 64.6 76.6 71.4 46.3 45.1
Retailing 62.1 71.5 64.1 50.6 46.1
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Table 5.3 Descriptive disclosure scores by industry (Cont)
Panel B: Analysis of disclosure scores by sector groupings
Overall 
intellectual 
capital
%
Human 
intellectual 
capital 
%
Structural 
intellectual 
capital
%
Relational 
intellectual 
capital 
%
Voluntary 
financial 
disclosure
%
Non-intellectual capital intensive sectors (N=38)
Mean 66.4 73.2 71.1 55.3 48.1
Median 68.1 77.3 72.2 57.1 50.0
Std dev 12.3 11.5 17.4 14.2 07.9
25th Quartile 59.0 67.0 61.1 47.6 40.5
75th Quartile 77.0 81.8 88.9 63.1 54.3
Intellectual capital intensive sectors (N=88)
Mean 71.7 75.2 74.8 65.3 45.4
Median 72.9 77.3 77.8 66.7 44.7
Std dev 10.9 11.2 12.5 15.6 10.0
25th Quartile 62.2 68.2 66.7 52.4 38.2
75th Quartile 80.3 81.8 83.3 76.2 53.9
T-tests Statistics -2.407** -0.914 -1.368 -3.404*** -1.492
***  Significant at the 1% level
  **  Significant at the 5% level
Bozzolan et al. (2005) compare the intellectual capital disclosure 
practices of ‘traditional’ and ‘knowledge-intensive’ sectors and show 
that intellectual capital disclosure differs by this sector classification. 
Unerman et al. (2007) also emphasise the importance of industrial sector 
to the pattern of intellectual capital disclosure practices.  Therefore, in 
Panel B, the industries are grouped into intellectual capital-intensive 
(knowledge-intensive) sectors and non-intellectual capital intensive 
(traditional) sectors.  The industry sectors that were classified as 
intellectual capital intensive are biotech and pharmaceuticals, IT, 
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business service providers, telecommunications, banks and insurance, 
media and publishing, aerospace and defence, chemicals, and electronic 
and electrical equipment.  The remaining industries, real estate, mining, 
retailing, engineering, food and beverages and utility were classified as 
non-intellectual capital intensive sectors.  Firms in intellectual capital 
intensive sectors are more likely to be heavily reliant on intellectual capital 
than non-intellectual capital intensive sectors (Amir and Lev, 1996; 
Barth et al., 2001; Bukh et al., 2005) and therefore likely to disclose 
more intellectual capital information.  
Consistent with Bozzolan et al. (2005) and Unerman et al. (2007), 
the resultant analysis appears to show that firms in intellectual capital 
intensive sectors provide greater levels of intellectual capital disclosure 
than firms in non-intellectual capital intensive sectors.  The mean overall 
intellectual capital disclosure for intellectual capital intensive sectors 
is 71.7% which is higher than the 66.4% for non-intellectual capital 
intensive sectors.  Similarly, intellectual capital intensive sectors seem 
to provide higher disclosures in the three intellectual capital categories 
than do non-intellectual capital intensive sectors.  However, whilst the 
intellectual capital scores are significantly different between intellectual 
capital intensive and non-intellectual capital intensive sectors for overall 
intellectual capital (at 5% level or better) and relational intellectual 
capital disclosures (at 1% level or better), no significant differences are 
observed between the two sector groupings for human and structural 
intellectual capital disclosures.  This suggests that human and structural 
intellectual capital are perceived as important in all firms regardless of 
whether they are in intellectual capital intensive or non-intellectual 
capital intensive sectors.  In this respect, it would seem that all firms 
consider human capital as important.  Wright et al. (1998) argue 
that human capital provides the means by which firms enhance their 
competitiveness and therefore it is possible that firms may want to 
showcase their human capital strengths to investors by disclosing more 
of this information.  The significant difference on relational IC disclosure 
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seems to suggest that relational capital is considered more important by 
intellectual capital intensive sectors than non-intellectual capital intensive 
sectors.  Guthrie et al. (2007) suggest that because these sectors operate 
in highly competitive environments, with increasingly segmented and 
fractured markets, relational capital may be viewed as a priority, hence its 
increased disclosure in these sectors.  Another observation from Table 5.3 
is that although industries such as utilities, retail and real estate, are not 
generally expected to rely heavily on knowledge-based assets (Unerman 
et al., 2007), the level of IC disclosure by these industries seems high. 
This generally emphasises the importance of intellectual capital in a firm’s 
value generating activities and the desire by firms to inform the market 
about the existence of these intangible assets.  
In terms of voluntary financial disclosure, non-intellectual capital 
intensive sectors exhibit greater disclosure than intellectual capital 
intensive sectors, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
There are two possible reasons for this.  First, it may well be that 
intellectual capital intensive sector firms are motivated to disclose more 
intellectual capital information and less financial information because of 
the perceived inadequacies of financial information in enhancing investor 
understanding of their value-creating capabilities.  Second, Barth et al. 
(2001) and Barron et al. (2002) show that analyst coverage for firms 
with greater investments in intellectual capital assets is more than for 
other firms.  An analysis of the study sample reveals that firms in the 
intensive sectors tend to have higher analyst coverage.  Hence the high 
intellectual capital disclosures may be a response to analyst pressure for 
intellectual capital information.
Analysis of disclosure scores by firm size
Intellectual capital disclosure studies (Guthrie et al., 2007; White et 
al., 2007; Li et al., 2008) show that large firms disclose more intellectual 
capital information.  To analyse the firm size effect in this study, firms 
were classified as large and small using the median market capitalisation 
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as the cut-off point.  Firms with market capitalisation which is higher 
than the median were classified as large firms and those with market 
capitalisation lower than the median as small firms.  Independent t-tests 
were undertaken to determine whether there are significant differences 
between each of the groups.  The results of this analysis are in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Descriptive disclosure scores by firm size
Market
capitalisation
£m
Intellectual capital disclosure
Voluntary 
financial 
disclosure
%
Overall  
intellectual 
capital
%
Human  
intellectual 
capital
%
Structural 
intellectual 
capital 
%
Relational 
intellectual 
capital 
%
Low market capitalisation (N=63)
Mean 219.42 63.0 68.8 67.3 53.3 40.5
Median 164.67 62.3 68.2 66.7 52.4 39.5
Std dev 171.22 10.1 11.7 13.2 13.2 7.5
25th 
Quartile 88.35 57.4 63.6 61.1 42.9 36.5
75th 
Quartile 355.38 72.1 77.3 77.8 61.9 46.1
High market capitalisation (N=63)
Mean 11,796.05 77.2 80.4 80.1 71.3 51.8
Median 3,030.21 77.0 81.8 83.3 71.4 52.6
Std dev 19,998.87 8.1 7.2 12.2 12.9 7.7
25th 
Quartile 1,635.57 72.1 77.3 72.2 61.9 46.7
75th 
Quartile 12,534.99 83.6 86.3 88.9 81.0 57.9
T-tests 
statistics -4.594*** -8.671*** -6.675*** -5.644*** -7.727*** -8.341***
***  Significant at the 1% level
The results show that, on average, large firms provide greater 
disclosure than small firms in all disclosure scores.  The t-tests for the 
mean disclosure for all disclosure scores reveal that there is a significant 
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difference between large and small firms (at 1% level or better).  These 
results are consistent with prior literature of intellectual capital and 
financial disclosures (see Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Guthrie et 
al., 2007; Li et al., 2008).  An interesting observation is that human 
intellectual capital disclosure is generally higher than the other types 
of disclosures in both large and small firms.  This seems to suggest 
that firms believe that investors are more interested in human capital 
than other forms of intellectual capital.  Large firms, however, seem to 
disclose significantly high levels of relational capital as in the other two 
categories.  Although still lower than human and structural intellectual 
capital disclosure scores, the 71.3% disclosure scores compare favourably 
with the other categories.  
Summary descriptive statistics for the cost of equity 
capital
The previous section presented the results of analysing the reporting 
of intellectual capital by UK listed firms.  In this section, the summary 
descriptive statistics of the cost of equity capital of the sample firms are 
presented and discussed.  Whilst the analyses of disclosure scores used 
the full sample of 126 firms, the analyses of cost of capital estimates is 
based on a reduced sample of 113 firms (see explanation in the next 
paragraph).  Table 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample 
of firms as well as for a reduced sample.
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Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics for cost of equity capital
Panel A:  Overall measures
Cost of equity capital Mean Median
Std 
dev
25th 
Quartile
75th 
Quartile
Full sample (%) 9.94 9.02 5.28 7.30 11.31
Reduced sample (%) 10.29 9.28 4.97 7.73 11.59
Panel B:  Distribution of cost of equity capital
Cost of equity capital
Full sample Reduced sample
No % No %
Under 5% 12 9.5 2 1.8
5% to <10% 66 52.4 65 57.5
10% to <15% 31 24.6 31 27.4
15% to <20% 10 7.9 10 8.9
20% to <25% 5 4.0 5 4.4
25% to <40% 2 1.6 0 0.0
Total 126 100.0 113 100.0
Table 5.5 (Panel A) indicates that the mean cost of equity capital 
for the full sample of firms is 9.94% which is lower than the 10.48% 
reported by Lee et al.  (2006).  In the full sample, some of the firms have 
cost of equity capital as low as 2% and as high as 35.7%.  However, Lee 
et al. (2006) show that the risk-free return for UK firms for the years 
2004 and 2005 was about 4%, suggesting that the observations of cost 
of capital that is lower than 4% are outliers.  Hence all firms with cost of 
equity capital below 4% were eliminated.  A total of eleven firms from 
the sectors of business service providers, IT, media and publishing, food 
and beverages, biotech and pharmaceuticals, real estate and mining were 
eliminated.  Additionally, two firms with cost of equity capital of 28.9% 
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(from business services providers sector) and 35.7% (from banks and 
insurance sector) were also removed from the sample.  This reduced the 
sample to 113 firms (all the three mining firms were eliminated) with 
cost of equity capital ranging from 4.8% to 23.3%.  The rationale for 
eliminating these firms is to reduce the effect of possible outliers, which 
may influence the cost of equity capital measures calculated (outliers are 
cases with cost of capital estimates that well above or well below most of 
the cases).  The resultant findings show some changes in the mean cost of 
capital from 9.94% for the full sample to 10.29% which is closer to the 
10.48% reported in Lee et al. (2006).  The lower and upper quartile cost 
of capital estimates are 7.73% and 11.59%, respectively.  The median of 
9.28% is lower than the mean suggesting that for most firms the cost of 
capital is lower than the mean.  Although, the cost of capital estimates 
obtained using full and reduced sample are similar, the findings reported 
in this report are based on the reduced sample of 113 firms.  
To gain some understanding of the cost of equity capital of UK 
firms, the estimates for the reduced sample were grouped into six 
categories (see Table 5.5, Panel B).  The distribution of the reduced 
sample shows that most firms (84.9%) have cost of equity capital ranging 
from 5% to lower than 15%.  Of the remainder, 1.8% of firms have 
cost of equity capital lower than 5%, 13.3% of firms have cost of equity 
capital ranging from 15% to lower than 25%.  
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Table 5.6 Industry cost of equity capital
Panel A: Cost of equity capital by industry (%)
Industry Mean Median
Std 
dev Min Max
Telecommunications services 13.59 13.01 5.41 6.70 20.80
IT 12.02 9.52 5.71 7.50 23.30
Aerospace and defence 11.50 9.90 4.90 7.60 17.00
Utility 11.29 6.80 7.23 5.00 23.00
Media and publishing 10.46 9.27 3.48 6.50 15.90
Business service providers 10.11 9.27 3.48 6.20 21.00
Banks and insurance 10.05 9.28 3.52 6.70 18.20
Retailing 9.95 8.80 3.04 6.50 14.70
Biotech and pharmaceuticals 9.80 9.28 3.15 6.50 15.20
Electronic and electrical  
equipment 9.74 10.20 1.35 7.40 10.80
Engineering 9.30 9.00 1.48 7.10 11.30
Food and beverages 9.17 7.72 3.77 5.60 16.20
Chemicals 7.03 7.80 1.42 5.40 7.90
Real estate 6.70 6.80 3.16 4.80 10.30
Panel B:  Cost of equity capital (%)
Intellectual capital intensive vs. non-intellectual capital intensive sectors
Sector groupings Mean Median
Std 
dev
25th 
Quartile
75th 
Quartile t-tests
Non-intellectual 
capital intensive 
sectors (33 firms) 9.68 8.80 4.17 6.85 11.85
Intellectual capital 
intensive sectors 
(80 firms) 10.56 9.35 3.88 7.92 11.72 -1.070
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Further analysis is presented in Table 5.6, Panel A and B.  In Panel 
A, the industries are ranked in descending order by their mean cost of 
equity capital.  As the results indicate, telecommunications services, IT, 
aerospace and defence, utility, media and publishing, business service 
providers and banks and insurance appear in the top list of sectors with 
high cost of equity capital, ranging from 10.05% to 13.59%.  With the 
exception of utility, these are classified as intellectual capital intensive 
sectors (see also Unerman et al., 2007).  In Panel B, the industries were 
classified into intellectual capital intensive and non-intellectual capital 
intensive sectors using dummies (1 if intellectual capital intensive, and 0 
if non-intellectual capital intensive).  The results of t-tests show that the 
non-intellectual capital intensive sectors have lower cost of capital than 
the intellectual capital intensive sectors, although the difference is not 
significant.  The non-intellectual capital intensive sectors enjoy a 0.88 
percentage points (10.56%-9.68%) lower cost of capital relative to the 
intellectual capital intensive sectors.  In their study of cost of capital, Lee 
et al. (2006) also show that some of the industries classified as intellectual 
capital intensive sectors in this project (such as telecommunications 
services, IT, media and publishing, business service providers and banks 
and insurance) have higher equity premiums than the other industries 
(such as retail).  Lee et al. (2006) attributes this higher cost of equity 
capital to greater uncertainty due to high growth, intense competition 
and shorter product life cycles associated with intellectual capital 
intensive sectors.  It is interesting to note that these sectors were also 
noted for their high disclosure level of intellectual capital information 
in this project.  It may well be that the high disclosures are an attempt 
to provide more information to investors and reduce the cost of equity 
capital.  
As noted above, the cost of equity capital for the utility sector of 
11.29% appears in the top list of firms with high cost of equity capital. 
This finding differs significantly from Lee et al. (2006).  These differences 
may derive from three reasons.  First, Lee et al.’s (2006) cost of capital 
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estimates are based on data collected over an 11-year period, whilst data 
for this study is cross-sectional.  Second, the number of utility firms in 
this study is only seven, which is not necessarily reflective of the utility 
sector.  Third, although the expectation is that the perceived market risk 
for utility firms should be lower because the sector is generally stable 
and low-growth (Lee et al., 2006), these firms provide essential services 
and therefore their operations (and pricing policies) are subject to high 
public as well as political scrutiny.  Consequently, their profit margins 
are lower and they are also easy targets for regulation and hence investors 
may demand a higher rate of return.  In general, however, the estimates 
of the cost of equity capital in this study are reasonably consistent with 
Lee et al. (2006).  Sectors reported in Lee et al. (2006) as having higher 
equity premiums also generally appear to have higher cost of equity 
capital in this study.
Summary
This chapter reports the results of analysing disclosure practices 
and cost of equity capital estimates of UK listed firms.  The results show 
that intellectual capital disclosures by UK listed firms are extensive, 
and are even greater than voluntary financial disclosures.  Firms seem 
to disclose more human intellectual capital and structural intellectual 
capital information than relational intellectual capital.  The disclosure 
scores were also analysed according to intellectual capital intensive and 
non-intellectual capital intensive sector groupings as well as firm size. 
The results indicate that in general, intellectual capital intensive sectors 
disclose a greater level of intellectual capital information than do non-
intellectual capital intensive sectors across all intellectual capital categories. 
However, significant differences only exist for overall intellectual capital 
disclosure and relational intellectual capital disclosure.  A comparative 
analysis of intellectual capital and voluntary financial disclosures suggests 
that intellectual capital intensive sectors disclose less financial information 
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than non-intellectual capital intensive sectors, suggesting that financial 
information may be considered by intellectual capital intensive sectors 
as of less importance in investor’s understanding of their operations. 
Additional analysis indicates that both intellectual capital and non-
intellectual capital intensive sectors disclose equally greater information 
about their human and structural intellectual capital, whilst firms in the 
intellectual capital intensive sectors provide significantly higher relational 
intellectual capital than non-intellectual capital intensive sectors.  
The results of analysing the cost of equity capital estimates were also 
presented.  The results indicate that the average cost of equity capital 
of UK listed firms is about 10.29%.  Further analyses show that most 
UK firms (84.9%) have cost of equity capital ranging between 5% 
and 15%.  Additional analyses of the cost of equity capital by industry 
suggest that firms in the intellectual capital intensive sectors such as 
telecommunications service, IT, aerospace and defence, media and 
publishing, business service providers, and bank and insurance have a 
higher cost of equity capital than firms in other sectors.  On average, 
the cost of equity capital is 0.88 percentage points higher for firms in 
intellectual capital intensive sectors than for those in non-intellectual 
capital intensive sectors.  In the context of the results of intellectual capital 
disclosure and cost of equity analyses in this chapter, the key question to 
be addressed in the next chapter of this report is whether firms benefit 
in terms of cost of equity capital by reporting greater intellectual capital 
information in their annual reports.       
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Introduction
Chapter five reports intellectual capital disclosure and the cost of equity 
capital of UK listed firms.  It notes that intellectual capital disclosure in 
the annual reports of UK listed firms is extensive.  The key question that 
this chapter addresses is whether firms with greater intellectual capital 
disclosure benefit in terms of a lower cost of equity capital.  The chapter 
is organised in two main sections.  The first section presents the findings 
of simple correlations of the association between the cost of equity capital 
and intellectual capital disclosures.  In the second section, the findings 
of further analyses, using independent t-tests to help understand the 
simple correlations of the relationship between cost of equity capital 
and disclosure, are presented and discussed.  Finally, the chapter finishes 
with a summary.  
Correlations of cost of capital and intellectual capital 
disclosure
This section discusses the results of the correlations between the cost 
of equity capital and intellectual capital disclosure and financial disclosure. 
The Spearman correlation results are presented in Table 6.1.  A correlation 
is a measure of the strength and direction of the relationship and ranges 
between -1 and +1.  The negative and positive signs reflect the direction of 
the relation whilst the strength of the relation is reflected in the absolute 
value, called the correlation coefficient.  A higher correlation coefficient 
indicates a stronger relationship.  
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Table 6.1 Spearman correlations of disclosure and cost of equity 
capital
Variables
Correlation coefficients 
for cost of equity capital
Intellectual capital disclosure -0.350***
Human intellectual capital disclosure -0.319***
Structural intellectual capital disclosure -0.285***
Relational intellectual capital disclosure -0.285***
Voluntary financial disclosure -0.301***
Market capitalisation -0.198**
Analyst coverage -0.331***
Market-to-book value 0.059
Leverage 0.111
Beta values 0.214**
*** Significant at the 1% level
  ** Significant at the 5% level
The correlations indicate that the cost of equity capital is 
significantly and negatively related to both intellectual capital disclosure 
and voluntary financial disclosures (at the 1% level or better).  The 
correlation coefficient for intellectual capital disclosure at 0.350 is 
greater than the 0.301 for financial disclosures.  This implies that the 
cost of equity capital is slightly more associated with intellectual capital 
disclosures than with financial disclosures.  The finding for intellectual 
capital disclosure confirms the results of Kristandl and Bontis (2007) 
who also find a negative relationship in a European setting and those 
of other voluntary disclosure studies (such as Gietzmann and Ireland, 
2005).  The table also shows that intellectual capital disclosure categories 
of human intellectual capital, structural intellectual capital and relational 
intellectual capital disclosures are also significantly and negatively related 
to the cost of equity capital.  It would seem, judging from the size of the 
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coefficient, that the cost of equity capital has a greater association with 
human intellectual capital disclosure than with structural and relational 
intellectual capital disclosures.  The size of the coefficients for structural 
and relational intellectual capital disclosures is the same, suggesting that 
they may have an equal impact on the cost of equity capital.  These 
findings suggest that investors may condition their beliefs on the return 
and future cash flows more on the basis of the quality of the firm’s 
human intellectual capital than on structural and relational intellectual 
capital.  Information on human intellectual capital may be considered 
by investors as important because human capital may be perceived as 
providing the means by which firms can enhance their competitiveness 
and performance (Wright et al., 1998).  For example, information on 
such items as the experience and qualifications of key employees is an 
indication of a firm’s competence in enhancing competitive advantage. 
In terms of the other factors that are suggested as influencing the 
cost of equity capital, it is observed, as expected, that firm size (market 
capitalisation) is significantly and negatively related to the cost of equity 
capital.  BETA, which is a measure of market risk, is significantly and 
positively related to the cost of equity capital, whilst market-to-book 
and leverage are not significant.  These findings suggest that large firms 
enjoy a lower cost of equity capital and high beta firms have a higher cost 
of equity capital, the latter being consistent with asset pricing theory.    
Independent t-tests for cost of capital and intellectual 
capital disclosure
In order to provide some additional insights into the Spearman 
correlations between the cost of equity capital and the different disclosure 
scores, the firms were divided into high and low-disclosing firms using the 
median disclosure as the cut-off point.  Firms with disclosures above the 
median are classified as high-disclosing firms and those below the median 
as low-disclosing firms.  Further, the different forms of disclosures were 
also interacted (by multiplying two disclosure types) and again using 
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the median as the cut-off point, firms were classified into high and low 
disclosure firms (using interacted disclosure scores).  
Table 6.2 reports the results of the t-tests for the relationship 
between cost of equity capital and disclosure scores.  The findings in Table 
6.2 confirm the correlation results in Table 6.1, thus, firms committing 
to greater disclosure enjoy a lower cost of equity capital.  For all the 
different types of disclosures, firms classified as high-disclosing seem to 
enjoy a significantly lower cost of equity capital than low-disclosing firms.
Table 6.2 T-tests of the relation between the cost of equity capital 
and disclosure
Level of disclosure
Disclosure Cost of capital
t-tests
Mean 
(%)
Mean 
(%)
Median
(%)
Std 
dev
Voluntary financial disclosure
  Low 40.5 10.86 9.28 6.28
  High 51.8 9.01 8.37 3.88 -1.988**
Overall intellectual capital disclosure
  Low 63.0 11.20 9.90 6.03
  High 77.2 8.41 8.05 3.71 -3.044***
Human intellectual capital disclosure
  Low 68.8 10.99 9.52 5.83
  High 80.4 8.15 7.87 3.59 -3.021***
Structural intellectual capital disclosure
  Low 67.3 11.16 10.13 6.23
  High 80.1 8.67 8.08 3.71 -2.720***
Relational intellectual capital disclosure
  Low 53.3 10.94 9.71 6.03
  High 71.4 8.59 8.16 3.71 -2.522**
*** Significant at the 1% level
  ** Significant at the 5% level
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It can be observed from the table that for firms with high overall 
intellectual capital disclosures, the cost of equity capital is 2.79 percentage 
points (11.20%-8.41%) lower than for low intellectual capital disclosing 
firms.  Consistent with the results from the Spearman correlation analyses 
above, firms disclosing more human intellectual capital seem to have 
a lower cost of equity capital compared to other intellectual capital 
categories disclosures.  The cost of equity capital for firms with greater 
human intellectual capital disclosure is 8.15% compared to 8.67% 
or 8.59% for firms with greater disclosure in structural or relational 
intellectual capital categories, respectively.  It can also be observed that the 
cost of equity capital percentage point benefit of 1.85% (10.86%-9.01%) 
for disclosing high versus low voluntary financial information is lower 
than the 2.79% for intellectual capital disclosures.  This implies that 
firms benefit more from lower costs of equity capital when they provide 
enhanced intellectual capital disclosures than when they provide greater 
levels of financial disclosures.  Another interesting observation is that for 
low-disclosing firms, the cost of equity capital is higher for intellectual 
capital disclosures than for financial disclosures.  The results indicate 
that the cost of equity capital of 10.86% for low financial disclosure 
firms is lower than the 11.20%, 10.99%, 11.16% and 10.94% for firms 
with low overall, human, structural and relational intellectual capital 
disclosures, respectively.  This seems to suggest that, given the greater 
value-relevance of intellectual capital disclosure, firms reporting low 
intellectual capital information are penalised more than firms reporting 
low financial information.  
Disclosure and cost of capital in intellectual capital 
intensive sectors 
In chapter five, the findings of disclosure in Table 5.3 revealed that 
intellectual capital intensive sector firms have higher intellectual capital 
disclosures than non-intellectual capital intensive sectors firms.  However, 
it was also documented in Table 5.6 that intellectual capital intensive 
sectors firms have higher cost of equity capital than non-intellectual 
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capital intensive sector firms.  Therefore, can intellectual capital intensive 
sector firms lower their cost of equity capital by enhancing intellectual 
capital disclosure? To address this issue, Table 6.3 presents the results of 
analysing the 88 intellectual capital intensive sector firms.  The firms were 
split into high and low disclosure firms via the median disclosure scores. 
Independent t-tests were then carried out to determine whether the 
difference in the cost of equity capital between high and low-disclosing 
firms was significant.  
Table 6.3 Disclosure and cost of equity capital for intellectual 
capital intensive sector firms
Level of disclosure
Disclosure Cost of capital
t-tests
Mean
(%)
Mean 
(%)
Median
(%)
Std 
dev
Financial disclosure
  Low 40.5 10.86 9.28 6.28
  High 51.8 9.01 8.37 3.88 -1.914*
Overall intellectual capital disclosure
  Low 62.5 12.12 10.13 6.42
  High 80.9 8.80 9.30 3.73 -2.963***
Human intellectual capital disclosure
  Low 68.4 11.62 9.98 6.21
  High 85.9 8.62 8.27 3.38 -2.577**
Structural intellectual capital disclosure
  Low 67.6 11.23 10.06 6.02
  High 87.9 9.05 8.05 4.02 -1.805*
Relational intellectual capital disclosure
  Low 53.9 11.59 10.13 6.33
  High 80.3 8.98 8.98 3.68 -2.265**
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 ** Significant at the 5% level
   * Significant at the 10% level
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The results as documented in Table 6.3 are consistent with those 
reported in Table 6.2 for the full sample of firms.  Firms with more 
disclosures enjoy lower cost of equity capital.  For example, for overall 
intellectual capital disclosure, high-disclosing firms have a mean cost 
of equity capital of 8.80% compared to 12.12% for low-disclosing 
firms.  The magnitude of the difference in the cost of equity capital is 
3.32 percentage points lower for firms with high intellectual capital 
information disclosure than for low-disclosing firms.  This difference is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that investors penalise firms for 
disclosing low levels of intellectual capital information in annual reports. 
The fact that the magnitude of the difference in cost of equity capital 
of 3.32% is greater than the 2.79% documented for the full sample 
of firms suggests that intellectual capital intensive sector firms benefit 
more from enhanced intellectual capital disclosures than the other firms. 
In terms of the individual intellectual capital category disclosures 
and financial disclosures, the findings suggest that firms benefit more 
from disclosing more human intellectual capital information than the 
other intellectual capital categories.  This is consistent with the findings 
reported in Table 6.2.  The magnitude of the difference in cost of equity 
capital for human intellectual capital information is 3.00% compared 
to 2.18% and 2.61% for structural intellectual capital and relational 
intellectual capital information, respectively.  However, unlike the 
results in Table 6.2, firms that are forthcoming in terms of relational 
intellectual capital information enjoy slightly lower cost of capital than 
for structural intellectual capital information.  This suggests that investors 
find relational intellectual capital information more useful for intellectual 
capital intensive sector firms.  
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Disclosure interaction and the cost of capital 
Finally, one of the objectives of this study is to examine whether 
intellectual capital and financial disclosure interact with each other 
to influence the cost of equity capital.  Pike et al. (2000) argue that 
intellectual capital and financial information interact to influence 
the valuation of firms, whilst Holland (2003; 2006) suggests that the 
intellectual capital categories also interact with each other in different 
ways to create firm value.  Similarly, Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) show 
that disclosure interactions affect the cost of equity capital.  To analyse 
the effects of disclosure interaction, this study computes the product of 
the different disclosure types (see Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007).  Each 
product (interaction) is then split into high and low interaction based 
on its median and t-tests are carried out.  The findings of this analysis 
are presented in Table 6.4.    
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Table 6.4 Disclosure interactions and the cost of equity capital
Disclosure scores
Cost of equity capital
t-tests
Mean 
(%)
Median 
(%)
Std 
dev
Overall intellectual capital and voluntary financial 
  Low 11.53 10.30 6.06
  High 8.13 8.03 3.46 -3.794***
Human intellectual capital and structural intellectual capital
  Low 11.46 6.29 10.36
  High 8.55 3.68 8.04 -3.194***
Human intellectual capital and relational intellectual capital
  Low 11.55 6.14 10.20
  High 8.32 3.63 8.05 -3.592***
Structural intellectual capital and relational intellectual capital
  Low 11.21 6.28 9.71
  High 8.62 3.58 8.16 -2.852***
Voluntary financial and human intellectual capital
  Low 11.35 6.05 10.20
  High 8.33 3.67 8.04 -3.331***
Voluntary financial and structural intellectual capital
  Low 11.28 6.15 10.25
  High 8.46 3.62 8.03 -3.090***
Voluntary financial and relation intellectual capital
  Low 11.02 6.22 9.71
  High 8.57 3.36 8.24 -2.652***
*** Significant at the 1% level
The results in Table 6.4 indicate that where the disclosure 
interactions are higher, the cost of equity capital is lower.  This suggests 
that firms that consistently disclose greater information across the 
different types are more likely to enjoy a lower cost of capital than firms 
with lower disclosure interactions.  A comparison between Table 6.2 
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and Table 6.4 suggests that the association between the cost of equity 
capital and disclosure is stronger when disclosures are interacted than 
for individual disclosures (compare t-tests statistics in the two tables). 
Similar conclusions can be drawn by looking at the mean cost of equity 
capital in the two tables.  For example, at the individual disclosure level 
(see Table 6.2), high financial and intellectual capital disclosure firms 
have costs of equity capital of 9.01% and 8.41% respectively.  However, 
when these two disclosure types are interacted, the cost of capital reduces 
significantly to 8.13%, which is 0.88 or 0.28 percentage points lower 
than for the individual financial and intellectual capital disclosures.  These 
results seem to confirm the argument that different types of disclosure 
do interact with each other (see Pike et al., 2000; Holland, 2003) in 
reducing the cost of capital, suggesting that in using disclosures investors 
attempt to balance the different disclosure types to decide on share prices.
Summary
This chapter presents the main findings of the study.  The cost of 
equity capital is negatively and significantly associated with intellectual 
capital disclosure and financial disclosure suggesting that firms that 
provide greater levels of intellectual capital information in their annual 
reports benefit in terms of cost of equity capital.  Further analyses 
divide firms into high and low disclosures via the median of each of the 
disclosure types.  The independent t-tests of high/low disclosure firms 
show that the cost of equity capital is significantly different between 
the two groups.  Firms with higher intellectual capital disclosure scores 
have cost of capital estimates that are 2.35 to 2.84 percentage points 
lower than for firms with lower intellectual capital disclosure across all 
intellectual capital categories.  Similarly, the high voluntary financial 
information disclosing firms enjoy a 1.85 percentage points lower cost 
of equity capital than the low-disclosing firms.  The magnitudes of the 
difference in cost of equity capital increases for the intellectual capital 
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intensive sector firms, ranging from 2.18% to 3.32%.  Further analyses 
interacting financial and intellectual capital disclosures show further 
reductions for firms that have more intellectual capital and financial 
disclosures.  In conclusion, firms that commit to improved intellectual 
capital disclosure in their annual reports benefit in terms of a lower cost 
of equity capital.
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Objectives of the study
This study investigates whether intellectual capital disclosure is associated 
with the cost of equity capital.  Intellectual capital has attracted 
considerable interest from practitioners, regulatory bodies, managers 
and academics, primarily stimulated by the perceived role it plays in the 
value-creating processes of firms.  Consequently, there have been calls 
for improved disclosure of investments in intellectual capital.  These 
calls have been driven particularly by the rationale that the traditional 
financial reporting model either immediately expenses or arbitrarily 
amortises investments in intellectual capital.  As a result, it has been 
argued that financial statements have lost relevance to investors because 
they fail to fully reflect investment in intellectual capital (Francis and 
Schipper, 1999; Lev, 2001).  The failure by traditional financial reporting 
systems to fully reflect intellectual capital investments, has created 
acute information asymmetries between investors and managers, and 
potentially increased opportunities for moral hazard, adverse selection 
and other opportunistic behaviour by managers.  This view has inspired 
many researchers to investigate the extent to which intellectual capital 
information is reported in annual reports (Unerman et al., 2007; Guthrie 
et al., 2007).  Such studies document that although intellectual capital 
reporting is still low, there has been an increase in intellectual capital 
disclosure in annual reports over the years.  Unerman et al. (2007) 
show substantial intellectual capital disclosures even in sectors where 
intellectual capital may not be expected to be a significant value driver, 
such as real estate, utilities and retailing.  
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This report has argued that although the literature documents an 
increasing trend in intellectual capital disclosure, there is limited research 
on whether firms benefit from improved intellectual capital disclosure via 
a lower cost of capital.  Reducing the cost of capital has been suggested 
by academics (see Lev, 2001) and accounting bodies and regulators 
(ICAEW, 2003; OECD, 2006) as a benefit of enhanced intellectual 
capital disclosure.  Consequently, this study has provided some insights 
on the relationship between the cost of equity capital and intellectual 
capital disclosure.  The key issues addressed by this study are:
•	 Is there a negative association between the cost of equity capital and 
the level of intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports?
•	 Is there a negative association between the cost of equity capital 
and the level of disclosure in the three individual intellectual capital 
categories (human; structural and relational capital)?
•	 Does intellectual capital disclosure interact with voluntary financial 
disclosure to influence the cost of equity capital?
Findings
This study found that the level of intellectual capital disclosure in 
UK annual reports is extensive, with an average of 70% of the intellectual 
capital information items used in this study being reported in some 
way.  This high level of disclosure may have been driven by the study 
period (March 2004 and February 2005) because the eventually repealed 
mandatory Operating and Financial Review was to be introduced in 2005 
and firms may have started adopting the requirements.  In general, firms 
seem to provide greater levels of information about human intellectual 
capital and structural intellectual capital than information on relational 
intellectual capital, although human intellectual capital information 
seems to dominate the other two categories.  Analyses classifying firms 
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into intellectual capital intensive sectors (such as banks and insurance, 
telecommunications, biotech and pharmaceuticals) and non-intellectual 
capital intensive sectors (such as utilities, retail, and real estate) indicate 
that both groups disclose equally greater information about their human 
and structural intellectual capital.  However, firms in intellectual capital 
intensive sectors provide significantly higher relational intellectual capital 
than non-intellectual capital intensive sector firms.  
The average cost of equity capital for the sampled UK listed firms, 
derived using the price-earnings growth model, is about 10.29%.  For 
most firms (84.9% of the sample firms), the cost of equity capital 
ranges between 5% and 15%.  Additional analyses splitting firms into 
intellectual capital and non-intellectual capital intensive sectors show 
that firms in the intellectual capital intensive sectors have a cost of 
equity capital that is about 0.88 percentage points higher than for firms 
in non-intellectual capital intensive sectors.  The higher cost of equity 
capital in these sectors can be attributed to greater investor uncertainty 
due to high growth, intense competition and short product life cycles 
associated with such sectors.
The study reveals that intellectual capital disclosure is negatively 
associated with the cost of equity capital.  Firms with greater levels 
of intellectual capital disclosures have cost of equity capital estimates 
ranging from 2.35 to 2.84 percentage points lower than for firms with 
low intellectual capital disclosures across all categories.  The highest 
benefit comes from disclosing greater human intellectual capital 
information with 2.84 percentage points lower cost of equity capital for 
high intellectual capital disclosure firms.  The analysis also reveals that 
intellectual capital intensive sectors have higher cost of equity capital 
than non-intellectual capital intensive sectors.  However, firms in the 
intellectual capital intensive sectors seem to benefit more from greater 
disclosure of intellectual capital disclosure information.  The results show 
that the magnitude of difference in the cost of equity capital is 3.32% 
lower for firms with greater intellectual capital disclosures.  The findings 
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also suggest that investors interact intellectual capital information with 
financial information in making investment decisions.  The results 
for interacting intellectual capital disclosure and voluntary financial 
disclosure measures show that the cost of equity capital is 0.28% and 
0.88% lower when compared to the cost of equity capital relating to 
the individual intellectual capital and financial disclosures, respectively. 
Limitations 
The findings reported in this study must be interpreted in the 
context of the following limitations.  The first limitation relates to 
measurement issues.  Intellectual capital information and voluntary 
financial information were measured using a dichotomous procedure 
and this does not differentiate firms on the basis of the detail provided 
for each item.  In addition, the procedure involves the application of 
judgement on whether the item of information being considered is 
indeed applicable to the firm and also to which category of disclosure. 
In the context of the cost of capital measure, the study uses only equity 
capital and not debt, so that the cost of capital used does not reflect the 
firm.  The model used to measure the cost of capital relies on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, which may not be used by firms in the UK.  However, 
Marston and Armitage (2007) suggest that some firms do use models 
that use analysts’ forecasts in computing their cost of capital.  
Second, the study uses annual reports to measure disclosure. 
Although there is research to suggest that annual reports are used, it 
is possible that because the information reported in annual reports is 
already known, its usefulness for investors is curtailed.  This implies 
that the extent to which the information disclosed in the annual report 
affects the cost of capital may be minimal.    
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Areas of further research  
Although the findings of this study have provided insights into 
the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital, further research is warranted.  First, this study can be 
replicated using finer measures of intellectual capital disclosure.  Rather 
than using a dichotomous procedure to measure intellectual capital 
disclosure, further research could consider the detail provided for each 
disclosure item.  This is likely to result in finer measures of intellectual 
capital disclosure which can better differentiate low and high-disclosing 
firms and enhance the quality of analysing the relationship between 
the cost of equity capital and intellectual capital disclosure.  Second, 
the findings of the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure 
and cost of equity capital are based on univariate analyses and these 
do not control for other factors that may influence the cost of equity 
capital.  This means that the relationships being observed may be due 
to these other factors rather than disclosure.  Therefore further analyses 
controlling factors such as firm size, beta, analyst following, leverage 
and market-to-book values should be conducted to provide additional 
insights into the relationships.  Third, further research could focus on 
examining the impact of the Disclosure and Transparency Rules and the 
new Companies Act 2006 on the reporting of intellectual capital.  In this 
respect research could investigate whether intellectual capital reporting 
has improved as a result of the mandatory requirements to report some 
intellectual capital information and the extent to which the requirements 
might have affected the cost of capital.
Conclusions
In conclusion, this study investigates the association between 
intellectual capital disclosure and the cost of equity capital of UK 
listed firms.  The results of the study indicate that there is extensive 
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disclosure of intellectual capital information by the firms.  Overall, the 
study also reveals that firms with greater intellectual capital disclosure in 
annual reports have a lower cost of equity capital than firms with lower 
intellectual capital disclosures.  In addition, firms that provide enhanced 
disclosures for both financial and intellectual capital disclosures do 
benefit more in terms of a lower cost of equity capital, suggesting that 
intellectual capital and financial disclosures are complementary.  On 
the whole, however, intellectual capital disclosure seems to dominate 
financial disclosure in influencing the cost of equity capital.  
The study contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, it 
provides the first evidence of the relationship between the cost of equity 
capital and intellectual capital disclosure in a UK context.  Second, 
unlike previous studies that tend to investigate aggregate annual report 
disclosures, this is the first study to distinguish between intellectual 
capital and voluntary financial disclosures and show how the two types 
of disclosure are independently associated with the cost of equity capital. 
Third, the study is also the first to empirically examine the effect of 
interacting intellectual capital and voluntary financial disclosures on 
the cost of equity capital.  
The findings in this report are also of considerable importance 
to both policy makers and firms.  Given the view expressed by both 
academics and policy makers that the traditional financial reporting 
model fails to provide investors with value-relevant information, it 
may well be that in the future, the reporting of intellectual capital 
information may be mandatory.  The attempt by the UK to make the 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) mandatory in 2005 (regulation 
later repealed) indicates potentially that future regulations may be 
formulated.  However, regulations should only be necessary if firms 
are not forthcoming in enhancing the disclosure of intellectual capital 
information in order to reduce information asymmetry.  Reducing 
information asymmetry decreases the chance that well-informed investors 
earn abnormal returns from trading with uninformed investors.  As 
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Holland (2001) argues, there is potential that market participants, such 
as institutional investors, may trade on information generated from 
private communications for which other investors may not be aware of. 
Therefore, the report is important for the following reasons:
•	 The findings show that disclosure of intellectual capital information 
by UK listed firms is extensive and the extensive intellectual capital 
disclosure seems to be driven by the voluntary guidelines provided 
in the OFR.  The implication for policy is that the decision to repeal 
the regulation for a mandatory OFR may have been appropriate as 
firms respond to voluntary reporting guidelines.  Hence, the focus for 
policy should be to develop best practice guidelines for intellectual 
capital reporting and encourage compliance with such guidelines. 
Such an approach reduces problems with prescriptive guidelines 
which require enforcing.  
•	 The evidence presented in this report shows that enhanced 
intellectual capital information disclosure is associated with a lower 
cost of capital, suggesting that investors find the information useful 
for the valuation of firms.  Thus, improved intellectual capital 
disclosure will also benefit market participants in terms of having 
more relevant information available, and therefore reducing the cost 
of gathering private information.  This understanding is important 
for policy makers because it provides a basis upon which regulators 
can evaluate the costs and benefits of intellectual capital disclosure 
as well as costs and benefits of potential regulations regarding the 
disclosure of intellectual capital information.  
•	 Armitage and Marston (2007) document that firms use cost of capital 
information in their capital investment decisions, and that finance 
directors perceive disclosure as influencing their cost of capital. 
The findings in this report provide managers with insights into the 
effects of enhancing disclosure of intellectual capital information on 
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their cost of equity capital.  Additionally, they can also gain some 
insights into the intellectual capital disclosure categories that are 
more important to investors in valuing firms.  Therefore, if managers 
realise that there are cost of capital related benefits in enhancing the 
reporting of intellectual capital information, they may have incentives 
to improve disclosure of this type of information.  
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Disclosure checklist
A    Intellectual Capital Information
I Structural Capital  
1. Intellectual property 
2. Process
3. Management philosophy
4. Corporate or organisational culture
5. Organisational flexibility/adaptability 
6. Organisational structure
7. Organisational learning
8. Research and development
9. Innovation
10. Technology
11. Financial relations
12. Customer support function
13. Knowledge-based infrastructure
14. Quality management and improvement
15. Accreditations
16. Overall infrastructure/capability
17. Networking 
18. Distribution network
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II Relational Capital
19. Customers
20. Market presence
21. Customer relationships
22. Customer acquisition
23. Customer retention
24. Customer training and education
25. Customer involvement
26. Company image/reputation
27. Company awards
28. Public relations
29. Diffusion and networking
30. Brands
31. Distribution channels
32. Relationship with suppliers
33. Business collaborations
34. Business agreements 
35. Favourable contracts 
36. Research collaborations
37. Marketing
38. Relationship with stakeholders
39. Market leadership
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III Human Capital
40. Number of employees
41. Employees age
42. Employee diversity
43. Employee equality
44. Employee relationship
45. Employee education
46. Skills/know-how/expertise/knowledge
47. Employee work-related competences
48. Employee work-related knowledge
49. Employee attitudes/ behaviour
50. Employee commitments
51. Employee motivation
52. Employee productivity
53. Employee training
54. Vocational qualification
55. Employee development
56. Employee flexibility
57. Entrepreneurial spirit
58. Employee capabilities
59. Employee teamwork 
60. Employee involvement with community
61. Other employee features
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B Voluntary Financial Disclosures
I Financial Analysis
1. Profitability ratios                                                                   
 i. gross margin                                                                
 ii. operating margin                                                            
 iii. net profit margin
 iv. return on equity
 v. return on capital employed
2. Cash flow ratios                                                                   
 i cash flow conversion ratio
 ii. free cash flow to equity 
 iii. cash flow to total debt                                          
3. Liquidity ratios                                                                    
 i. current ratio
 ii. acid test                                                                              
4. Gearing ratios  
 i. gearing ratio
 ii. interest cover 
 iii. debt/EBITDA
5. Dividend cover ratio 
6. Graphical presentation of key data   
 i. total sales                                                                           
 ii. sales by business segment/product line
 iii. operating profit
 iv. operating cash flows 
 v. earnings per share  
 vi. dividend per share             
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7. Analysis of free cash flows 
8. Financial history summary                                                    
 i. two years 
 ii. three years
 iii. four years
 iv. five years
 v. more than five years
9. Comments on change in sales                                             
 i. note   
 ii. detail                                                                    
10. Comments on change in operating profit                             
 i. note
 ii. detail                                                                       
11. Comments on change in cost of goods sold                       
 i. note
 ii. detail     
12. Comments on change in selling and administration expenses
 i. note
 ii. detail
13. Comments on change in interest expense or interest income 
 i. note
 ii. detail
14. Comments on change in working capital
 i. stock
 ii. debtors
 iii. creditors
15. Discussion of cash flow position
 i. cash inflows and outflows
 ii. cash flow balance
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16. Discussion of capital structure
17. Commentary on level of borrowings
 i.   level
 ii. detail
18. Discussion of acquisitions and effects of results
 i. discussion of acquisition
 ii. discussion of effects on results
19. Discussion of disposals and effects on results
 i. discussion of disposals
 ii. discussion of effects on results
20. Commentary on the effects of inflation on operations
21. Commentary on effects of interest rates on operations
22. Effects of foreign currency fluctuations on operations
23. Effects of commodity prices on results
24. Disclosure of capital expenditure in general
 i. level
 ii. detail
25. Quantitative geographical capital expenditure
26. Quantitative line of business capital expenditure
27. Creditor payment policy 
II Forecast Information
28. Forecast of sales
 i. qualitative forecast of sales
 ii. quantitative forecast of sales
 iii. assumptions underlying the forecasts
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29. Forecast of profits
 i. qualitative forecast of profits
 ii. quantitative forecast of profits
 iii. assumptions underlying the forecasts
30. Forecast of cash flows
 i. qualitative forecast of cash flows
 ii. assumptions underlying the forecasts
31. Order book or backlog information
 i. total order book 
 ii. by line of business 
 iii. by geographical area
III Capital Market Data
32. Share trading information
 i. trend
 ii. year end 
33. Share price information
 i. trend
 ii. year end
 iii. range
 iv. detail (monthly/quarterly)
34. Domestic and foreign shareholdings
35. Distribution of shareholdings by type of shareholders
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The price-earnings growth model
The model used in this study to compute the cost of equity capital of 
UK sampled listed companies is the price-earnings growth (PEG) model 
developed by Easton (2004). The PEG model is used in this study for a 
number of reasons. First, the method has less onerous data requirements, 
only requiring share prices and analyst earnings forecasts to compute 
the cost of equity capital. Second, prior studies (Botosan and Plumlee, 
2005; Easton and Monahan, 2005; Hail and Leuz, 2006) show that the 
estimates for the cost of capital from the PEG model are fairly similar 
and positively correlated to the other two alternative approaches: residual 
income valuation (RIV) model and abnormal earnings growth (AEG) 
model. However, they also show that the PEG model dominates the 
two alternative approaches in terms of how the cost of capital estimates 
correlate with the known risk proxies. Chen et al. (2004) also show in an 
international setting that the RIV model performs poorly in European 
countries, and that the AEG model is either inferior to, or equivalent 
with, the PEG model in all countries. Finally, using the PEG model 
enables comparison of the cost of equity capital estimates with those 
obtained by Lee et al. (2006) using the same model to compare the cost 
of capital of UK and European companies. 
The PEG model computes the implied cost of equity capital of a 
company using one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings per share 
forecasts as well as the share price. In developing the model, Easton 
(2004) started the no arbitrage assumption that current price is equal 
to the discounted value of next period’s expected price (adjusted for the 
expected dividend payout during the period): 
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P₀   =   (1  +  r)-1   [P₁  +  dps₁]     (1)
Where:
P₀  = Share price at time t = 0;
P₁ =  Expected share price at time t=1;
dps₁ = Expected dividends per share at time t = 1; and  
r = Expected rate of return and r > 0 is a fixed constant        
Easton (2004) then adds (and subtracts) capitalised expected accounting 
earnings, eps₁/r, to Equation (1) to capture the valuation role of forecasts 
of next period’s accounting earnings. This yields:
P₀ = eps₁/r   –  [ eps₁/r   –   (1  +  r)-1    (P₁  +  dps₁)]  (2)
Assuming that the expected accounting earnings, eps₁ is not equal to 
economic earnings, Easton (2004) re-writes Equation (2) to consider the 
role of two-period-ahead forecasts of accounting earnings. This results in:
P₁ = eps₂/r   –  [ eps₂/r   –   (1  +  r)-1    (P₂  +  dps₂)]  (3)
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2) yields:
P₀  = eps₁/r + r-1(1 + r)-1agr₁ + (1 + r)-2[r dps₂ – (1 + r) eps₂] + (1+r)-2P₂   (4)
Where:
agr₁ =   [eps₂  +  rdps₁  –  (1  +  r)eps₁] (5)
agr₁  is the expected abnormal growth in accounting earnings
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Easton (2004) then performs recursive substituting for P2 , P2 , P4 , etc., 
in Equation (5) to consider the valuation role of expected accounting 
earnings beyond the two-year forecast horizon. This yields:
∑∞
=
−− ++=
1
1
10 )1(/
t
t
t agrrrrepsP                             (6)
suggesting that the present value of the agrt- sequence explains the 
difference between price and capitalised expected earnings. Easton (2004) 
then modifies Equation (6) to accommodate a finite forecast horizon 
by defining a perpetual rate of change in abnormal growth in earnings 
(Δagr) beyond the forecast horizon. Assuming earnings are available for 
two periods, Equation (6) may be written as:
P₀ = eps₁/r   +  agr₁/(r(r  -  Δagr))    (7)
Where:
Δagr  = (agr2 /agr1 )  -  1     
Easton (2004) then imposes the assumption, where Δagr = 0, implying 
that the expected abnormal earnings growth of next period is an unbiased 
estimate of subsequent periods’ abnormal earnings growth (that is agr₁ 
=agr₂=agr₃=...,...).  By imposing this assumption, Equation (7) may be 
re-written as:
P₀ =  [eps₂  +  rdps₂  –  eps₁]/r²     (8)
and solving this Equation 8 leads to: 
0
2
P
epsrdpseps r 11 −+=
     
(9)
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Finally, Easton (2004) then imposes two additional assumptions. 
One, dps₁=0, and two, that growth is non-negative: eps2  ≥ eps1 > 0. 
The latter assumption is to avoid having to take the square root of a 
negative number.  Imposing these assumptions on Equation (9) yields 
the following valuation formula, which is employed to compute the cost 
of equity capital in this study:
0
12
PEG P
epseps r −=
                                         
(10)
Like any other accounting-based valuation model, the PEG model has 
limitations. First, the model excludes dividends and longer horizon 
growth in the computation of the cost of capital estimates. However, 
Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and Easton and Monahan (2005) show 
that the correlations between the implied cost of equity capital computed 
from the AEG (which incorporates both dividends and longer horizons) 
and the known risk proxies are weaker than with the PEG model. Second, 
the assumption that  eps2  ≥ eps1 > 0  imposes sample restrictions in 
this study in that all companies that fail to meet this assumption are 
eliminated in the analyses. This may have biased the sample towards more 
stable and less risky companies (Lee et al., 2006). However, there is no 
reason to suggest that these restrictions could have materially affected 
the cost of equity capital estimates used in the study.
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In a knowledge intensive economy, a company’s intellectual capital, whether it is 
derived from its employees, customer databases or brands, undoubtedly contribute to 
a company’s success and its ultimate value.  Most of these intangible assets can not be 
included within a company’s balance sheet and intellectual capital disclosures in the 
annual report and financial statements have been largely voluntary.
There are good reasons why companies may choose not to disclose information about 
these types of assets, not least the worry about losing competitive advantage, but there are 
clearly reasons why companies choose to make such voluntary disclosures.  It is argued 
that one reason for disclosing such information is to reduce the information gap between 
companies and investors and thus reduce the cost of capital.  This report investigates 
the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and the cost of equity capital.
The results of this study indicate that firms which make greater levels of intellectual 
capital disclosure benefit from a lower cost of equity capital than firms making lower 
intellectual capital disclosures.  The study estimates that this benefit is significant, at 2.8 
percentage points.   The study recognises that other factors may also be at play and that 
further research is necessary to investigate the impact of these other factors.  
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